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A B S T R A C T
The problem of antimicrobial resistance surveillance in Europe has been debated extensively in many
excellent documents issued by national committees that often assume the value of national guidelines.
However, a comprehensive document addressing the whole matter from a European perspective, as
well as reviewing its present status and drafting future perspectives, has been lacking. The present
recommendations have been produced by the ESCMID Study Group for Antimicrobial Resistance
Surveillance (ESGARS) through a consensus process involving all members of the Study Group. The
recommendations focus on the detection of bacterial resistance and its reporting to clinicians, public
health officers and a wider—and ever-increasing—audience. The leading concept is that the basis for
resistance monitoring is microbiological diagnostics. The prerequisites for resistance monitoring are
findings of adequate quality and quantity, which have been recorded properly and evaluated correctly.
Different types of surveillance studies should fulfil different requirements with regard to data collection
and reporting, the expected use of data, and the prerequisites for networking such activities. To generate
relevant indicators, bacterial resistance data should be reported using adequate denominators and
stratification. Reporting of antimicrobial resistance data is necessary for selection of empirical therapy at
the local level, for assessing the scale of the resistance problem at the local, national or international
levels, for monitoring changes in resistance rates, and for detecting the emergence and spread of new
resistances types. Any type of surveillance study should conclude, where appropriate, with a proposal
for intervention based on the data obtained.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The emergence and spread of antimicrobial resist-
ance constitutes a major risk for human health.
Resistance to antibiotics limits the success of these
agents in the therapy and prevention of infectious
diseases. Yet society should be aware of the fact
that many accomplishments of modern medicine
have only been possible because of the availability
of a protective antibiotic umbrella. However,
continuous positive selection of resistant bacterial
clones, whether pathogenic, commensal or even
environmental bacteria, will modify the popula-
tion structure of microbial communities, leading
to accelerated evolutionary trends with unpre-
dictable consequences for human health.
Historical background: the past decade
Surveillance of bacterial resistance to antimicro-
bials involves important financial and intellectual
resources throughout Europe, and coordination
and harmonisation of these resources are
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beginning to rank increasingly high among the
priorities of scientific societies, public health
officers and legislators [1].
Even though previous efforts on the part of
both individual scientists and pharmaceutical
firms—mostly from Europe—must be acknow-
ledged [2–5], most current activities in the field of
antimicrobial resistance surveillance are rooted in
the 1995 ASM Task Force Document [6], the
primary aim of which was ‘to assist the prepar-
ation of cumulative antimicrobial susceptibility
reports that would prove useful to clinicians in
the selection of the most appropriate agents for
empirical antimicrobial therapy’.
National surveillance systems (or data collec-
tions) arose in Europe in response to two different
driving forces, broadly reflecting the two main
political and economic assets that dominated our
continent throughout the Cold War period, namely:
• in western Europe—high-level academic inter-
est in antibiotic resistance; creation of compre-
hensive networks of microbiological facilities in
hospitals; availability of new technologies, e.g.,
new automated tools for antimicrobial suscep-
tibility testing, entailing both locally based and
large-scale data collection systems; and surveil-
lance initiatives on the part of pharmaceutical
companies;
• in eastern Europe—a heritage of centrally con-
trolled public health organisations, frequently
facilitating ongoing centralised data collection.
The need to compare the many different solu-
tions which developed within the framework of
these two broad models, and an awareness of the
increasing importance of the antimicrobial resist-
ance problem, resulted in a meeting in 1997 on
‘The present status of antimicrobial resistance
surveillance in Europe’, organised by the World
Health Organisation (WHO) in Verona, Italy [7].
Among the key findings of the workshop were the
following:
• Much useful information was already being
generated in Europe on antimicrobial resistance.
• The emergence and growth of antimicrobial
resistance could not be addressed effectively
by any one country or group working in
isolation.
• Europe-wide coordination and cooperation
were critical elements for any effective ap-
proach, in order to develop collaboration
between existing antimicrobial resistance sur-
veillance programmes.
A significant outcome of the Verona meeting
was the establishment of the ESCMID Study
Group for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance
(ESGARS), with the following main aims:
• to provide a unifying forum for those involved
actively in antimicrobial resistance surveillance;
• to promote awareness and facilitate the early
detection of emerging antimicrobial resistance
in Europe, and to contribute to an understand-
ing of its epidemiology;
• to improve access to European data on surveil-
lance;
• to provide opportunities to enhance cooper-
ation;
• to establish links with and between networks of
resistance surveillance programmes.
A further step towards harmonisation of anti-
microbial resistance surveillance in Europe was
the creation 1 year later of the European Anti-
microbial Resistance Surveillance System
(EARSS) [8]. The EARSS, funded by DG SANCO
of the European Commission and coordinated by
the Dutch National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment (RIVM), is a European
network of national surveillance systems that
collects comparable and validated antimicrobial
resistance data for public health purposes. Data
generated routinely are collected and analysed,
and on-line feedback is provided [9]. Results of
antimicrobial susceptibility testing for invasive
Staphylococcus aureus and Streptococcus pneumoni-
ae isolates have been collected since 1999, and in
2001 the EARSS started collecting data for
invasive Escherichia coli and Enterococcus faecal-
is ⁄ faecium isolates. More than 600 laboratories in
28 western and eastern European countries
currently participate [9]. External quality assur-
ance exercises carried out by the EARSS in
cooperation with the UK National External
Quality Assessment Scheme (UK-NEQAS) and
the French Centre National de Re´fe`rence des
Antibiotiques (CRAB) in 2000, 2001 and 2002
showed that the laboratories involved are cap-
able of delivering comparable and high-quality
susceptibility data [10].
Large-scale exploitation of routine data
A major advance in antimicrobial resistance
surveillance is the increasing availability and
exploitation of routine susceptibility test data.
Originally, resistance surveillance was conducted
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largely in the form of ad-hoc studies, often
sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. Sample
sizes were often small, and most studies were
beset by sampling errors or lack of a denominator.
Routine susceptibility test data have a population
denominator, and represent a huge and some-
times untapped source of inexpensive, accessible
results, although several objections have been
raised [11]:
• Standardisation of both methodology and inter-
pretative criteria is often poor.
• Many laboratories test relatively few antimicro-
bial agents against most isolates, and they do
not all test the same compounds.
• ‘Second-line’ antimicrobial agents are often
tested only against isolates resistant to agents
used more widely.
• Many isolates are only identified partly, mean-
ing that data from different species may be
pooled and major resistance developments in
infrequent species are likely to be missed.
In spite of these concerns (see later), a major
advantage is that surveillance systems can be fed
simply by downloading data regularly on a wide
range of organisms and specimen types. The main
reason for a curb on the wider acceptance of
routine data for surveillance was possibly related
to the fact that the extensive availability of such
data had an impact on huge interests in terms of
both money and power stemming from the
private control of antimicrobial resistance surveil-
lance (which is somehow different from the
control of antimicrobial resistance), as often
occurs when advances in technology alter a
well-established steady state [12]. It is worth
noting that once the antibiotic resistance problem
became a fashionable issue, routine susceptibility
test data suddenly turned out to be reliable—even
beyond their own limits—when a for-profit com-
pany proposed its monitoring strategy based on
routine data collected from a number of hospitals.
The use of routine data is now accepted widely, as
opposed to the costly and labour-intensive tradi-
tional active surveillance, in that it can produce a
great deal of useful, easily accessible and suffi-
ciently accurate information.
However, it must be borne in mind that
antimicrobial resistance surveillance can be
based on routine data only when there is a
steady flow of diagnostic samples submitted for
laboratory testing. This precondition is generally
met in most of western Europe, but in some
parts of eastern Europe (because of either limited
resources or the size of the country), there is an
almost complete lack of microbiological diagnos-
tic samples, which can preclude any meaningful
surveillance based on routine samples. In such
instances, surveillance strategies in the absence
of widespread diagnostic sampling should be
assessed.
Existing documents on antimicrobial resistance
surveillance in Europe
The problem of surveillance in Europe has been
debated extensively in many excellent docu-
ments issued by national committees that often
assume the value of national guidelines. Among
others, the documents issued by Austria [13],
Belgium [14], Denmark [15], Finland [16], France
[17], Ireland [18], Norway [19], Spain [20] and
the UK [11] are of particular relevance. How-
ever, a comprehensive document addressing the
whole matter of antimicrobial resistance surveil-
lance from a European perspective, as well as
reviewing its present status and drafting future
perspectives, has been lacking. Consequently,
the ESGARS committed itself to producing a
wide-acceptance document through a consensus
process involving all members of the Study
Group.
Following this process, the present document
focuses on the detection of bacterial resistance
and its reporting to clinicians, public health
officers and a wider—and ever-increasing—audi-
ence. The leading concept throughout the docu-
ment is that ‘the basis for resistance monitoring is
microbiological diagnostics. The prerequisites for
resistance monitoring are findings of adequate
quality and quantity, which have been properly
recorded and correctly evaluated.’ [13].
G E N E R A L C O N C E P T S
Surveillance: a definition
Surveillance is a systematic, ongoing data collec-
tion, analysis and reporting process that quanti-
tatively monitors temporal trends in the
occurrence and distribution of susceptibility and
resistance to antimicrobial agents, and provides
information useful as a guide to medical practice,
including therapeutics and disease control activ-
ities.
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Its main objectives are:
1. to describe and quantify trends in acquired
antimicrobial resistance in important species as
a rational basis for establishing empirical ther-
apy, and for evaluating and comparing strat-
egies to counteract the development of
resistance in both hospital and community
settings;
2. to inform those bodies or institutions capable
of identifying effective public health interven-
tions for resistance containment, and of devel-
oping specific public health policies for
improving patient care;
3. to detect new antimicrobial resistance mecha-
nisms, and to develop continuously updated
systems for interpretative reading of antibiotic
susceptibility tests;
4. to detect the threat of dissemination of especi-
ally unwanted resistance mechanisms or clones,
e.g., methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA),
vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), or
extended-spectrum b-lactamases (ESBLs) in
hospital wards, and multiresistant Mycobacteri-
um tuberculosis or Strep. pneumoniae with high-
level penicillin resistance in the community; and
5. to serve as an inspiration for standardisation
and harmonisation of antimicrobial suscepti-
bility testing among laboratories taking part in
the surveillance programme.
To achieve these objectives, both regular sur-
veys (non-directed data retrieval) and ad-hoc
studies (targeted at a particular problem) are
used in surveillance. Note that ad-hoc studies are
often derived from observations obtained during
regular surveys.
Resistance rates should be obtained:
• for well-defined microorganisms and antibiot-
ics;
• at regular time periods;
• in well-defined spatial locations, i.e., country,
town, hospital, or internal hospital area;
• in precise biological ⁄ sociological ⁄ clinical com-
partments, e.g., isolates from bacteraemia, from
urine, from osteomyelitis, or from individuals
of a certain age, or from immigrants.
Only in these circumstances can comparisons
be made, and the differences analysed in such a
way that specific action can be taken.
The detection of abnormal bacteriological
events (e.g., low levels of acquired resistance or
new patterns of resistance) is also an important
objective of surveillance. Two specific aspects of
resistance can also be addressed: (1) the spread of
resistance genes through the bacterial world; and
(2) the consequences of bacterial resistance (e.g.,
treatment failure, morbidity, mortality, economic
impact).
The surveillance targets
Surveillance of resistance trends can be focused
theoretically on different targets.
Evolving trends in antibiotic resistance
1. Description and quantification of biological
resistance using epidemiological cut-off values. Each
species exhibits a natural relationship to each
antimicrobial. It may possess intrinsically high or
low sensitivity to the action of a drug, but the
MICs for wild-type organisms are usually distri-
buted over a ten-fold concentration interval, e.g.,
0.008–0.064 mg ⁄L (Strep. pneumoniae vs. benzyl-
penicillin), 0.064–0.5 mg ⁄L (Pseudomonas aerugi-
nosa vs. ciprofloxacin), or 0.25–2 mg ⁄L (E. coli
vs. gentamicin), or 4–32 mg ⁄L (E. coli vs. nitrof-
urantoin).
The European Committee on Antimicrobial
Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) has utilised this
to define ‘epidemiological cut-off values’
(WT £ X mg ⁄L) which determine whether an
organism is wild-type in relation to a particular
antimicrobial. The epidemiological cut-off value
can be used to describe and quantify biological
resistance, possibly but not necessarily predicting
future resistance trends regardless of clinical
sensitivity or resistance. It offers the possibility
of early action (measures to counter the develop-
ment of further resistance) and assessing the
results of such action from the modified distribu-
tion of susceptibility values, i.e., in the form of a
true biological phenomenon. A further advantage
of the epidemiological cut-off value is that it is not
subject to differences in opinion, which is often
the case with more clinically orientated break-
points. Fig. 1 shows the natural distribution of
ciprofloxacin MICs for wild-type E. coli, and the
epidemiological cut-off value (WT £ 0.064 mg ⁄L)
as defined by EUCAST.
2. Description and quantification of clinical resist-
ance using pharmacological ⁄ clinical breakpoints. The
use of more clinically orientated breakpoints in
surveillance of antimicrobial resistance meets
with problems. There is as yet no consensus
on how to define clinical ⁄pharmacological
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breakpoints, which means that there are great
differences in clinical breakpoints for some
drug–organism combinations, and that the
resulting surveillance data, based only on break-
points and on ‘S ⁄ I ⁄R’ interpretative categorisa-
tion, may be completely invalid in a broader
context.
Thus, the use of clinical breakpoints for anti-
microbial surveillance should be accompanied by
the collection and display of MIC (or inhibition
zone diameter) distributions. Fig. 2 shows that the
European countries involved in EARSS [9] pro-
duce very comparable raw data [10], which may
become extremely difficult to interpret if clinical
breakpoints are applied and only the semiquan-
titative interpretations (S, I and R) are used to
describe and quantify resistance.
Evolving trends in the incidence of particular
mechanisms of resistance
For this purpose, the surveillance targets could
be: (1) genes or gene combinations encoding
mechanisms of resistance; (2) the specific prod-
ucts coded for by resistance genes (such as
penicillin-binding protein (PBP) 2a, b-lactamases
or CAT enzymes); (3) resistance phenotypes that
are characteristic of a given mechanism of resist-
ance. In this way, surveillance could be focused
on the detection of strains producing PBP2a
(detection with monoclonal PBP2a antibodies),
or on strains harbouring the mecA gene (detection
with PCR), or on singling out S. aureus isolates
with a given susceptibility profile for further
analysis with more specific methods.
Evolving trends in the incidence of particular resistant
clones
In many cases, it is the spread of a particular
resistant clone that influences the prevalence of
antibiotic resistance. Surveillance of a particular
clone whose presence is known to influence
clinical antibiotic resistance can be done in differ-
ent ways:
1. Phenotype of the clone. In some cases, when
resistance emerges, there is a single clone (or
a small number of clones) that is responsible
for resistance. In this simple case, the resist-
ance phenotype (resistance to the new anti-
biotic) serves, at least for a certain period of
time, to identify the clone. In other cases,
there is a particular combination of pheno-
typic resistance traits that may characterise
the clone.
2. Genotypic traits of the clone. Particular genetic
polymorphisms in one or more genes (not
necessarily those involved in the resistance
mechanism), or in non-coding regions, fre-
quently identify a particular clone. Many tech-
niques are available to identify particular
clones, but are often used only in specialised
laboratories. Nevertheless, increasing simplifi-
cation of clonal detection techniques will make
this type of surveillance fully accessible in the
short term. Detection of a single resistant
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Fig. 1. Ciprofloxacin MIC distribution for wild-type
Escherichia coli, as obtained by means of the EUCAST
web-based program ‘Antimicrobial wild-type distributions
of microorganisms’ (http://www.eucast.org). Data (4416
observations) were pooled from six sources, such as
breakpoint committees, surveillance programmes, the
pharmaceutical industry and scientific reports. Epidemio-
logical cut-off: WT £ 0.064 mg ⁄L.
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Fig. 2. Streptococcus pneumoniae isolates vs. erythromycin
from data collected by the EARSS in 2001. The erythro-
mycin S ⁄ I breakpoints used by countries involved in the
EARSS were S < 0, 5, 1 and 2 mg ⁄L, while the I ⁄R
breakpoints were R > 0.5, 1, 2 and 4 mg ⁄L.
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isolate in a given patient rarely gives rise to a
resistance problem in the short term, but if the
strain disseminates among three or more
patients, this is a presumptive sign of the
epidemicity of a particular clone, and perhaps
some kind of action should be taken.
Evolving trends in the incidence of antibiotic-resistant
infections
Infections that fail to be cured when treated with
given antibiotics (surveillance of infection re-
sponse–antibiotic pairs) are of particular interest
for clinicians. Very little has been done in this
very important field of surveillance. Advances in
research procedures for quantitative evaluation of
the clinical response to antibiotics will be needed.
Surveillance studies
Different types of surveillance studies should fulfil
different requirements with regard to data collec-
tion and reporting, the expected use of data, and
the prerequisites for networking such activities.
Surveillance of evolving qualitative trends in low-level
and high-level antibiotic resistance
Data collection requires unequivocal definition of
acquired low-level and high-level resistance for
each antimicrobial and in each individual species.
For that purpose, consensus quantitative epide-
miological cut-off values (for detecting low-level
resistance) or clinical breakpoints (for high-level
resistance) should be established first in order to
ensure comparisons in time and space. Quantita-
tive methods of determining MICs (or even
properly measured zones of inhibition in disk
tests) are therefore required. The methodology
and accuracy of these methods requires stand-
ardisation among participating laboratories, as
well as appropriate quality control strains with
known MICs (susceptible strains and strains with
known mechanisms of low-level and high-level
resistance).
For reporting purposes, results could be ex-
pressed in terms of: (1) the percentage of strains
belonging to the wild-type distribution, i.e., with
an MIC equal to or below the epidemiological cut-
off value, showing the proportion of strains
devoid of any resistance level; (2) the percentage
of strains exhibiting clinical resistance, i.e., above
the clinical R breakpoint; (3) the percentage of
strains showing high-level resistance, when a
defined breakpoint for high-level resistance exists
(e.g., gentamicin high-level resistance in Ent.
faecalis). Note that the concentrations to be tested
in MICs, or the precise procedure for disk-
diffusion testing, should be agreed at the start of
the study. Eventually, the report should only
stratify the percentage of strains in the categories
‘wild-type’, ‘clinical resistance’ and ‘high-level
resistance’ categories. A minimal stratification of
data should be included, at least according to the
few basic patient features available in a typical
laboratory information system (LIS), for instance:
specimen type, in ⁄ outpatient, and type of ward
for inpatients.
For studies focused on detecting changes in
low-level antibiotic resistance, the main use will
be to detect the evolution of organisms from
susceptibility to low-level resistance, as a way of
predicting the emergence of high-level resistance.
If the studies are focused on high-level (clinical)
resistance, it will be useful to define the types of
infections (caused by particular organisms) in
which a number of antibiotics could be of clinical
interest.
For the purposes of networking organisation,
many of these studies could be based on retro-
spective as well as prospective (continued) work
(‘routine surveillance’ [21]); in general, partici-
pants should represent different types of laborat-
ories (located in hospitals of different sizes, in
teaching ⁄non-teaching hospitals, or in facilities
serving community patients), which should have
a functional LIS.
Surveillance of evolving quantitative trends in
low-level and high-level antibiotic resistance
The essential purpose of these studies is the
identification of possible changes, within a bac-
terial species, of the proportion of strains differing
in their level of sensitivity at different concentra-
tions of a given antibiotic. Indeed, the purpose is
similar to that described above, but with a more
detailed examination of the number of strains
inhibited by each antibiotic concentration (and
not just at the cut-off values or breakpoints).
1. Data collection requires technology to quantify
MICs by a pre-established test method with a
common range of antibiotic concentrations,
and including quality control procedures that
should involve known strains with different
levels of antibiotic susceptibility. Reports
should be given in a population analysis
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format in the form of tables and distribution
graphs (number or percentage of strains inhib-
ited at each antibiotic concentration).
2. These studies enable the trends in bacterial
populations inhibited by different antibiotic
concentrations to be followed. Analysis of
these trends may provide interesting insights
into the frequency of evolution of the members
of a given species from full susceptibility to
low-level resistance, and hence to clinical
resistance. In the case of newly introduced
drugs, these studies are of critical importance
for determining the presumptive cut-off values
(and sometimes the breakpoints) to categorise
a given strain as being susceptible, or having
intermediate or high-level resistance to the
antibiotic.
3. The laboratories involved in networking in this
type of activity should have facilities for
conducting quantitative susceptibility studies,
and for storing these results in LISs.
Surveillance of resistant clones
The aim of these surveillance studies is to detect
and monitor the quantitative evolution of a
number of resistant bacterial strains (clones)
whose dissemination is expected to create health
problems in the therapy of infectious diseases.
Examples of surveillance for resistant clones are
the protocols for detecting and monitoring the
following:
• spread of Enterobacteriaceae and Gram-negat-
ive non-fermenting bacilli with extended-spec-
trum b-lactamases, acquired AmpC
cephalosporinases or carbapenemases;
• vancomycin-resistant Ent. faecium or S. aureus;
• very high-level penicillin resistance in Strep.
pneumoniae;
• methicillin- or linezolid-resistant S. aureus;
• isoniazid and rifampicin resistance in M. tuber-
culosis.
Several of these clones are or tend to become
multiresistant to antibiotics, since selection of the
clone by one particular antibiotic may lead to
further enrichment and spread of the bacterial
population, which facilitates the acquisition of
resistance to new antibiotics.
Surveillance of resistant clones can be carried
out simply by detecting strains endowed with a
previously established suspicious phenotype, iso-
lated by normal procedures. The surveillance
study may be carried out to detect these resistant
clones when present in low frequencies in the
patient population (or also in suspected carriers).
For this purpose, enrichment or selective media
(containing a selective antibiotic or even a mixture
of selective antibiotics) can be used to detect the
clone.
• The data recovery should be done according to
a very stringent protocol of strain identification;
in general, these strains should be collected
prospectively throughout the survey to facili-
tate further genetic work that will confirm and
identify the clonal type. The survey should
include the study of a wide range of antibiotics
in susceptibility testing. These types of surveys
are highly dependent on good stratification of
the type of samples and data of patients (or
carriers). The importance of local clonal spread
means that it is important to know the precise
time and compartment in which the strains
were obtained (hospital ⁄ community, but also
secondary compartments, such as type of ward,
or intensive care unit (ICU) in hospital; or
outside, e.g., day-care centres). Data should be
reported as prevalence of the clone (or suspec-
ted clone) with respect to the patient frequency
parameters in a given compartment, e.g., 100
admitted patients, 1000 patient-days, or 100 000
inhabitants. For comparative purposes, the
number of isolates of the same species origin-
ating in the same period of time in the same
compartment should be provided, but such a
procedure cannot be adopted if the clonal
search has been performed by applying enrich-
ment or selective culturing. Of particular inter-
est is the handling of the problem of repeated
isolates in the same patient (see later).
• This type of surveillance is of great interest in
detecting and describing outbreaks, in helping
to design control measures, and in assessing the
impact of control measures. Such studies will
enable an understanding of the features of
clonal circulation within and between compart-
ments; the clone is a ‘tagged’ organism that
bears witness to the bridges and gaps that exist
between different environments.
• The hospital laboratories that are expected to
network with others for the purposes of sur-
veillance of clonal resistant strains should have
a special interest (and experience) in the study
of nosocomial infections; preferably they
should have genetic facilities for clonal identi-
fication and ⁄ or be linked regularly to central
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laboratories performing such tasks. In the case
of community microbiological facilities, there
should be adequate interest and experience in
infectious diseases and epidemiology, and easy
contact with larger hospital laboratories of the
type mentioned above. In both cases, there
should be facilities to collect (mainly prospec-
tively) specific data on patients and their
clinical and therapeutic environments.
Surveillance of antibiotic-resistant infections
The term ‘antibiotic-resistant infections’ can be
interpreted in two ways. First, it could refer to
documented infections caused by resistant bac-
terial organisms (‘enhanced surveillance’ [21]).
Second, it could be used to define infections that
are treated unsuccessfully (‘resistant to’) by anti-
biotics. In the latter case, there may or may not be
a resistant causative organism, since antibiotic
resistance is not the only feature accounting for
treatment failure.
Taking the first meaning of the term, the
interest in this surveillance method is to analyse
trends in the frequency of documented infections
caused by resistant bacteria. In other words, the
high prevalence of antibiotic resistance in a given
species does not automatically mean a high
prevalence of a given type of antibiotic-resistant
infection. With the exception of cultures taken
from normally sterile sites, a substantial number
of isolates in the hospital environment are
obtained from infected patients, but are not
necessarily the cause of the infections. Some
surveillance studies have therefore focused on
determining only the resistance frequencies of
invasive pathogens (e.g., blood cultures in the
EARSS-promoted studies). In this particular case,
the number of antibiotic-resistant infections
should approach closely the number of antibi-
otic-resistant bacteria, provided that the break-
point is appropriate. However, patients with
profound neutropenia may have antibiotic-resist-
ant infections caused by antibiotic-susceptible
bacteria.
For this type of surveillance protocol, data
recovery should basically include the types of
infection under surveillance, with as much detail
as possible. Going into more specific detail could
be critical for good stratification: e.g., resistant
bacteraemia associated with intravenous cathe-
ters, resistant lower urinary tract infections
(UTIs), resistant purulent effusions from chronic
otitis, or resistant lower respiratory tract infec-
tions in Anthonissen II-type chronic bronchitis.
Data on age and gender, the type of underlying
condition (e.g., immunosuppression, diabetes),
the place and time of previous hospitalisation (or
stay in day-care centres), as well as any history
of previous antibiotic therapy, are of crucial
interest in these studies. To evaluate the medical
risk associated with particular resistant clones, a
comparison should be made with a group of
well-matched patients suffering from the same
type of illness, but from whom susceptible
bacteria were isolated. Data in the analysis
should include the prevalence of resistant strains
in the species involved in the infection(s), as well
as the number and incidence of events with
resistant strains in the exposed population. An
example from the WHO 2002 recommendations
[21] is ‘cases of ciprofloxacin-resistant E. coli
community-acquired bacteraemia ⁄ 100 000 inhab-
itants’.
The use of data obtained by this type of
surveillance should serve to modify or refine the
therapeutic indications of different antibiotics for
a given type of infection, to shape treatment
strategies (antibiotic policies), to alert clinicians to
possible therapeutic failures, and to provide
useful epidemiological indicators for public
health services. The institutions that will be
interested in networking this type of surveillance
study should be able to engage in mostly pros-
pective work with a standardised protocol
(‘enhanced surveillance’ [21]). In general, such
institutions should have considerable experience
in dealing with infectious diseases.
R E Q U I R E D O R D E S I R A B L E
I N F O R M A T I O N
General principles of data collection
The principles of data collection and their specific
requirements differ according to the type of infor-
mation desired. Retrospective studies based on
LISs can be used to generate general statistics and
strain population data, provided that the quality of
the results is assured by the use of reference
strains, and that standardised definitions are used.
Given the current state of medical data computing
in most institutions (hospital information system;
HIS) and the linking of such systems to LISs, infor-
mation on resistance in documented infections and
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multidrug resistance (MDR) surveillance can be
generated only by means of prospective studies.
Any effort to extend and improve the HIS–LIS
linkage should be encouraged.
Implementation of these recommendations can
succeed only if the LIS is well-adapted to this
task. LIS integration into the overall HIS may be
an advantage, as clinical data can be extracted
more easily, but at the same time, the tools
needed for laboratory-based surveillance are
often not included in these comprehensive HIS
solutions. It would be an excellent achievement to
promote the integration of laboratory and clinical
information systems where laboratory surveil-
lance capabilities are maintained.
Results and data elements to be included:
definitions, thesaurus
Both the bacteriological results (primarily bacter-
ial identification and susceptibility test results)
and the accessory information that is usually
available in LISs (patients, specimens, dates, etc.)
should be based ideally on definitions and a
thesaurus shared by all laboratories participating
in resistance monitoring networks. These defini-
tions and thesaurus are used during the constitu-
tion of the laboratory database, and are helpful
tools for subsequent data extraction and merging
processes in network databases.
Data on the laboratory
Each individual laboratory should be identified
by a unique code in the network database.
Patient data
Identity. Patient identity is normally specified in
an LIS, but is not included in network databases
for confidentiality reasons. However, patient
identification is a frequent prerequisite for iden-
tifying duplicate isolates. The patient identifier
can be the family name, first name and date of
birth, the coding system used in the hospital (e.g.,
rank of hospital admission), or any other unequi-
vocal identifier used in the LIS.
Date of birth and sex. The date of birth can yield
the patient’s age, which can be extracted for the
network database.
Home address. The postal (zip) code of the
patient’s hometown may be useful to analyse
the geographical distribution of resistance, par-
ticularly in community-acquired infections.
Patient relationship vis-a`-vis the healthcare system at
the time of sampling
Ambulatory patients. Patients living in a private
home and who are generally referred for samp-
ling to a laboratory (only sampled occasionally at
home).
Home care patients. Patients cared for at home by
private or public health institutions. These
patients usually have a history of recent, some-
times recurrent, hospitalisation and, conse-
quently, may carry nosocomial bacteria. For that
reason, they should not be pooled with ambula-
tory patients.
Patients in long-term care facilities. Patients admit-
ted intermittently or permanently to old people’s
homes or similar facilities, the nature of which
differs appreciably between different countries
and even within a given country. These patients,
as well as their infections and pathological spec-
imens, present many peculiarities [22], so that
mixing their data with those of ambulatory
patients is a major mistake when it comes to
tracing the epidemiology of antimicrobial resist-
ance [23].
Patients attending day-care clinics. These patients
generally have a long history of hospitalisation
and must not be pooled with ambulatory patients.
Patients hospitalised in healthcare facilities for more
than 24 h. This is the largest group of patients
undergoing bacteriological investigation and the
most diversified. In order to permit good data
stratification, it is necessary to specify the type of
facility (teaching hospital, general hospital, pri-
vate institution, cancer treatment centre) and,
particularly, the type of medical activity of the
department in which the patient is hospitalised,
basically:
• emergency rooms;
• gynaecology and obstetrics;
• paediatrics;
• medicine (as a whole, or specifying internal
medicine, infectious diseases, cardiology, pneu-
mology, gastroenterology, nephrology or acute
geriatric units);
• haematology and oncology;
• surgery (as a whole, or specifying gastrointes-
tinal surgery, urology, orthopaedics, cardiac
and thoracic surgery, neurosurgery);
• ICUs;
• transplantation units;
• psychiatry;
• casualty departments and wards;
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• rehabilitation (e.g., after surgery or neurol-
ogy).
If more detailed lists are used, definitions and
possible pooling should be agreed by the different
laboratories included in the surveillance network.
Information on dates
For ambulatory patients, patients cared for at
home, and patients attending day-care clinics, only
the date of sampling is required. For patients
hospitalised in healthcare facilities, the date of
admission to the facility should also be provided in
order to allow calculation of the interval between
admission and sampling (see definitions of no-
socomial vs. community-acquired infections).
Data on the specimen
Each specimen is identified in the LIS by means of
a unique number, which is usually not transferred
to network databases for confidentiality reasons.
Environmental specimens (surfaces, water, etc.)
and quality controls should be classified sepa-
rately. A distinction should be made between
specimens for clinical diagnosis and specimens
for screening specific bacteria, since their purpose
and implications in resistance surveillance are
different, namely:
• Specimens for clinical diagnosis are sampled
for the individual diagnosis (positive and aetio-
logical diagnosis) of infectious diseases, i.e., to
detect and identify causative bacteria. Bacterial
isolates are the main source for resistance
monitoring.
• Specimens for screening specific bacteria (often
referred to as ‘colonisation’, ‘screening’ or
‘ecological’ specimens) are sampled mostly at
fixed intervals of time (for monitoring purpo-
ses) or during a specific epidemiological study
(cross-sectional survey). The most frequent
sampling sites are the rhinopharynx, rectum
or faeces, skin and vagina. These specimens are
used to detect targeted species (e.g., S. aureus,
Salmonella enterica, Strep. agalactiae) or the resist-
ance pattern in a species (MRSA, ESBL, VRE,
etc.). Consequently, whether or not screening
specimens can be used for resistance monitor-
ing depends on the aspect investigated. Thus, in
the case of S. aureus, they can be used to survey
either the resistance within this species in
carriers, or the carriage prevalence of the
species in a given group of patients, while in
the case of MRSA, they can be used to survey
either associated resistance traits (resistance of
MRSA to gentamicin, glycopeptides, etc.), or
the prevalence of MRSA carriage in a given
group of patients (e.g., in an ICU). They cannot,
however, be used to survey the rate of MRSA
among S. aureus isolates.
Specimens collected for screening purposes
should be classified separately by the sampling
site and the bacteria targeted.
It is worth considering that the resistance
frequencies generated in phase II and III clinical
trials are in most cases much lower than those
generated when clinical isolates are surveyed
from diagnostic laboratories. This is possibly
because all patients are (or should be) sampled
in clinical trials, while the samples sent to diag-
nostic laboratories in many countries come from
patients who may be considered as ‘abnormal’,
e.g., because they fail to respond to therapy,
relapse after the end of treatment, or have more
severe infections than normal. This is especially
the case for outpatients and in healthcare systems
in which those submitting specimens consider the
cost of laboratory examinations to be important.
For these reasons, it may be advantageous to
initiate surveillance studies in which all patients
with defined types of infections are sampled, i.e.,
to mimic for surveillance purposes the system
implemented in phase II and III trials.
Minimum thesaurus for clinical specimens
The following minimum thesaurus is intention-
ally limited to the most frequent specimens, the
interpretation of which is relatively unequivocal
and allows good stratification of data. The
medical significance of other types of specimens
may be more controversial (e.g., wound swabs or
fluid taken from drains). By classifying such
specimens in the category ‘others’, the informat-
ive value and specificity of the statistics are
improved, although the amount of detail is
obviously reduced. The category ‘others’ can
also be subdivided, as required, into broad
subgroups. Specimens of fairly unequivocal
interpretation include the following:
• Blood culture.
• Urine (applies strictly to urine itself, thus
excluding catheter equipment). The circum-
stances of urine sampling, e.g., patients with
indwelling catheters, should be specified, if
available:
• intravascular devices;
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• peripheral catheters;
• central catheters;
• perfusion chambers.
• Serous fluid obtained by puncture:
• cerebrospinal fluid;
• pleural fluid;
• joint fluid;
• peritoneal fluid;
• pus taken from closed, normally sterile
anatomical sites by puncture or surgery
(such specimens with high informative
value are distinguished from those taken
from drains or swabs, whose significance is
uncertain).
• Protected or distal respiratory samples:
• bronchial brush;
• protected distal specimen;
• bronchoalveolar lavage.
• Unprotected respiratory samples (distinct from
the above, since their interpretation is more
controversial).
• Bronchial aspiration;
• Sputum.
• Stools.
• Urethral and cervical ⁄ vaginal samples.
• Bile.
Indicators, denominators and data stratification
To generate relevant indicators, bacterial resist-
ance data should be reported using adequate
denominators and stratification. Denominators
are adapted to the type of question addressed
by the surveillance. The range of complexity
levels is large, from low complexity, e.g., frequen-
cies of resistance in a given species, to very high
complexity, e.g., the proportion of a resistant
organism in a given type of infection and a given
epidemiological setting (Table 1). Several param-
eters are used for generating these indicators,
some related to medical activity and some to the
patient.
Medical activity parameters
Some useful parameters describe the medical
activity in the exposed population or in the
hospital where the monitoring takes place:
For hospital laboratories:
• number of beds, relevant for any ward or
hospital—acute care (e.g., medicine, surgery,
obstetrics), intensive care, rehabilitation and
long-term care;
• number of direct admissions (i.e., excluding
internal ward tranfers) lasting >24 h (relevant
only for acute care wards and ICUs);
• number of hospitalisation days (relevant for
any ward or hospital);
• number of samples (relevant for any ward or
hospital).
For laboratories working for general practitioners:
• numbers of practitioners referring bacterio-
logical samples;
• size of the population covered;
• number of samples.
Such parameters can be used for several pur-
poses:
• as likelihood controls, e.g., expected number
of strains for a given bacterial species in a
given period of time;
• for stratification of results, e.g., comparative
MRSA rates in a set of hospitals, according to
the number of beds or admissions;
• as denominators for statistics, e.g., incidence
of community-acquired pneumonia caused
by penicillin-resistant pneumococci ⁄ 100
admissions in acute care, or incidence of
MRSA ⁄ 1000 bed-days;
• to make extrapolations from the results ob-
tained in the monitored population or set of
hospitals (e.g., number of pneumococci or
MRSA isolated annually in the whole country)
using regional or national health statistics
(e.g., total number of inhabitants and distri-
bution by age in the case of community-
acquired infections, or total number of beds,
hospitalisations ⁄year, and hospitalisation
days ⁄ year in the case of hospital-acquired
infections).
Parameters concerning the patient
Parameters used for community-acquired infections.
Some parameters correlating with the rates of
resistance in community-acquired infections,
Table 1. Indicators used for resistance surveillance
Simple Percentage of resistance in a given species, e.g., percentage
of MRSA among S. aureus in general
Medium Percentage of resistance in a given species isolated from a
given type of sample, e.g., percentage of ciprofloxacin-resistant
E. coli isolated from urine in acute care
Complex Percentage of resistance in a given type of infection, e.g.,
percentage of ciprofloxacin-resistant E. coli isolated from
community-acquired UTI
Very
complex
Incidence of a given type of infection caused by particular
resistant bacteria in a specified epidemiological setting,
e.g., incidence of MRSA bacteraemia acquired
in ICU ⁄ 1000 hospital days
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e.g., UTIs, pneumococcal respiratory tract infec-
tions, tuberculosis, and probably other types of
infections, are particularly relevant for resistance
monitoring.
• Urinary tract infections. Several parameters influ-
ence the respective distributions of E. coli (the
most prevalent bacterial species, which is usu-
ally sensitive to many antibiotics) and other less
frequent—and generally more resistant—spe-
cies (e.g., Klebsiella spp., Enterobacter spp., Ser-
ratia spp., P. aeruginosa), including a previous
history of UTI, antibiotic therapy or hospitali-
sation. The same applies to the prevalence of
E. coli strains resistant to the main antibiotics
used to treat lower UTIs [17]. These parameters
are of particular importance when analysing
the results of monitoring based on samples
from ambulatory patients, since the probability
of such patients having a sample taken is much
higher in the case of relapse of UTI, or in the
case of risk factors such as recent indwelling
catheters or surgery, than in the case of a first
episode of UTI with no risk factors. As a
consequence, generating rates of resistance
based on indiscriminate samples from all
ambulatory patients would lead to an overes-
timate of the rates of resistance and overuse of
the most recent drugs.
• Pneumococcal infections. Rates of resistance to
b-lactams or macrolides, as well as multidrug
resistance in Strep. pneumoniae, are known to be
associated with several parameters, namely age
of the patient, recent treatment with b-lactams,
macrolides or co-trimoxazole, and recurrent
infections [24–29]. These parameters are helpful
for analysing changes in the prevalence of Strep.
pneumoniae resistance correctly, and for monit-
oring the impact of measures aimed at reducing
this prevalence (e.g., a reduction in the volume
of antibiotic prescriptions in children, or better
control of pneumococcal transmission in day-
care centres).
• Tuberculosis. In this case, the key parameter
associated with resistance is a history of treat-
ment with anti-tubercular drugs. This param-
eter makes it possible to distinguish between
the rate of primary resistance (strains isolated
from patients with no history of treatment, or
‘new cases’) and that of secondary, or acquired,
resistance (strains isolated from patients with a
history of treatment). Both rates should be
assessed separately [30]. Since these rates differ
significantly from one country to another
according to the quality of patient management,
it is also recommended that resistance statistics
should be presented according to patient domi-
cile, nationality or, even better, country of
origin.
Parameters used to define the community-acquired or
nosocomial nature of infections in healthcare facilities.
Resistance rates are higher among bacteria
causing nosocomial infections than among those
causing community-acquired infections for two
main reasons, namely: (1) a higher proportion
of naturally resistant species among bacteria of
nosocomial origin (e.g., P. aeruginosa); and (2)
a higher proportion, within a given species, of
isolates with acquired resistance traits that
cause nosocomial infections [31]. This is why
it is so important, in the case of hospitalised
patients, to distinguish between community-
acquired bacteria and bacteria of nosocomial
origin [21].
However, it must be borne in mind that several
multiresistant organisms have appeared recently
outside the hospital, particularly non-multiresist-
ant MRSA and CTX-M b-lactamase-producing E.
coli [32,33].
Nosocomial infections are defined as infections
not present (and not incubating) at the time of
admission, and which are acquired in a healthcare
facility. Except for infections with a known
incubation period (such as legionellosis), the
incubation period is considered generally to last
for 48 h. Consequently, when the interval be-
tween admission to the hospital and onset of
infection is >48 h, the infection is considered to be
nosocomial. Community-acquired infections are
defined as infections not acquired in a healthcare
institution.
In practice, a bacterial strain is presumed to
be of nosocomial origin if it is isolated from a
patient who has been hospitalised for at least
48 h or transferred from another healthcare
facility (the latter cases should be kept separate).
Conversely, a bacterial strain can be presumed
to be community-acquired if isolated from an
ambulatory patient or from a patient hospital-
ised for <48 h who was not transferred from
another healthcare facility. A more precise
definition, which takes account of the patient
history, is helpful to ascertain the community-
acquired or nosocomial nature of infection in
particular cases, namely:
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• Infections that are essentially of nosocomial
origin (e.g., MRSA), but which can be consid-
ered wrongly as community-acquired if there
was a previous unrecorded hospital stay [32].
• Infections that are essentially, or almost exclu-
sively, acquired in the community (e.g., typhoid
fever or listeriosis), but which can be consid-
ered wrongly as nosocomial if the diagnosis
after admission to the hospital is delayed (e.g.,
blood cultures taken after the second day of the
hospital stay).
• Any infection diagnosed within the first 48 h
after readmission, which could be either com-
munity-acquired or linked to a previous hospi-
tal stay. Patient characteristics and the history
or nature of the infection may suggest either
community-acquired infection (e.g., S. aureus
whitlow) or hospital-acquired infection (e.g.,
S. aureus surgical wound infection).
Parameters used for monitoring multidrug-resistant
bacteria (MDRB) in healthcare facilities (for countries
with high resistance rates). MDRB are those show-
ing combined resistance to at least two major
drugs used in therapy. Indicators are based on the
following parameters:
• Numerator: number of MDRB isolated from
specimens for clinical diagnosis, in patients
hospitalised throughout the period, excluding
duplicate isolates.
• Denominator:
• number of strains of the same species isolated
in the same conditions (will generate rates of
resistance in the species);
• number of direct admissions, i.e., excluding
ward transfers, and number of days of
hospitalisation throughout the period (will
generate rates of incidence and incidence
density).
It is also recommended:
• To calculate for each case the interval
between the date of hospitalisation and the
date of sampling, which gives an idea of the
time taken to acquire a MDRB in the facility.
• To define the ratio of acquired to imported
cases, which reflects the efficacy of the MDRB
control programme within the facility.
• To stratify MDRB data according to:
• the main types of specimen: blood culture,
surgical wound and protected respiratory
specimens (which are probably linked to
severe infection), and other samples (which
may reflect colonisation);
• the main types of medical activity (e.g.,
acute care, intensive care, rehabilitation,
long-term care).
T H E I S S U E O F D U P L I C A T E I S O L A T E S
In any type of surveillance, data collection should
include each distinct event in order to ensure
sensitivity, but should include it once only in
order to ensure specificity. For surveillance of
bacterial resistance, each distinct event refers to a
distinct bacterial isolate. Every effort should be
made to exclude redundant or duplicate isolates
from analysis. In human medicine, and especially
in healthcare facilities, microbiologists are con-
fronted every day with the practical problem of
identifying duplicate isolates, since, for many
patients, separate specimens can yield bacteria of
the same species.
Justification for not counting duplicate isolates
The high proportion of duplicate isolates, and
their impact on published resistance rates, has
been demonstrated repeatedly, particularly in the
hospital setting [17,34–37]. Indeed, when dupli-
cate isolates are included, the rate of resistance
tends to be higher, particularly for species in
which drug resistance is frequent (S. aureus,
P. aeruginosa, etc.), because resistant strains have
a higher probability of not being cleared by
antibiotic therapy, and will be isolated several
times (see below; Tables 2 and 3).
For these reasons, several systems for identify-
ing duplicate isolates have been proposed, relying
upon: (1) isolation rank; (2) characteristics of the
strains (mostly their antibiogram pattern); or (3)
more complex principles. Whatever the system
used, strains must be identified to the species
level, and the duration of the reference period
must be defined (generally the period covered by
the surveillance).
In practice, the question of duplicate isolates
arises mainly in human medicine, especially in
healthcare facilities. Indeed, when resistance
monitoring concerns the community or animals,
repeated specimens from a given individual are
unusual, and exclusion of duplicate isolates
makes little difference to resistance frequencies.
In contrast, repeated screening of patients colo-
nised by resistant organisms (e.g., MRSA or VRE)
adds greatly to the likelihood of duplicate
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isolates, and affects susceptibility reports sub-
stantially (besides being in itself a strong bias
towards resistance, since screening usually re-
ports only resistant isolates [36]).
It is important to bear in mind that there is no
single ‘correct’ way to eliminate duplicates, and
that each criterion may fit different data applica-
tions and ⁄ or provide complementary views of the
data [38]. Moreover, elimination of duplicates
might mask trends in emerging resistance, and
thus it is advisable that all ‘filtered’ reports be
accompanied by a careful analysis of all—i.e.,
unfiltered—susceptibility data included in the
database.
Whatever the system used for their definition,
duplicate isolates must not be deleted from the
LIS, since every bacteriological event is important
from the patient’s point of view. Duplicate iso-
lates can be flagged in each patient chart of the
LIS as ‘duplicates’, and then excluded only at the
time of data analysis or data extraction. Indeed, in
some situations (e.g., chronic infections), it might
be useful to estimate how long a patient had been
carrying resistant bacteria. This indicator of ‘per-
sistence of resistant bacteria’ is often used in
nosocomial infection surveillance, and is a further
justification for keeping all bacteriological events
stored in the LIS for all patients.
Besides considering which of the different
criteria best fits an individual database or specific
reporting needs, even greater care should be
taken when comparing results where these cri-
teria may be different or of uncertain application.
Definitions of duplicate isolates
Definition based on isolation rank (time criterion)
By this criterion, all but the first isolate of a
particular species isolated from a single patient
during the period covered by the surveillance are
excluded from the analysis. Different filter peri-
ods obviously result in different numbers of
isolates being included in the database, with
more extended time periods resulting in lower
resistance frequencies, as exemplified in Table 2.
Since the susceptibility frequencies obtained
with the various patient- and episode-based meth-
ods do not differ very much [37], calculations that
include only the first isolate of a particular species
recovered from each patient during a given time
interval represent an increasingly popular way of
eliminating duplicates. This method is simple,
reproducible and unequivocal, and can be applied
by any computer, provided that there is a unique
patient identification number. Therefore, automa-
tion of this process should be simple, even in the
absence of sophisticated software.
Isolation rank based on the ‘first isolate ⁄patient’
has been chosen by the National Committee for
Clinical Laboratory Standards (NCCLS) for
reporting antimicrobial susceptibility test data,
‘with the primary aim of guiding clinicians in the
selection of empirical therapy’ [38]. Advantageous
though this criterion may be, it should not be
considered as the standard in all instances in
which susceptibility data are reported and the
problem of duplicate isolates is encountered. In
particular, this procedure cannot detect selection
of resistance that occurs within the observation
period, thereby giving an overly optimistic view of
each patient’s pathological course and the per-
centage of susceptible strains [39].
Definition based on susceptibility pattern
With this method, all but the first isolate of a
given species, obtained from the same patient
during the period covered by the surveillance,
and sharing the same—or a very similar—sus-
ceptibility pattern (antibiotype), are excluded
from the analysis. A non-redundant (‘original’)
Table 2. Effect of criteria used for excluding duplicate
isolates from susceptibility reports (basis = rank of isola-
tion [36])
Isolates
Proportion of resistant isolates
Klebsiella spp.
Enterococcus spp.
vancomycin
(n = 12 000)
E. coli amoxycillin
(n = 31 000)
gentamicin
screen incl.
(n = 6800)
screen excl.
(n = 5800)
All 31 21 13 45
First isolate, based on period of:
5 days 26 17 12 45
30 days 19 13 10 44
365 days 15 11 10 44
Table 3. Effect of duplicate isolate exclusion on resistance
rates (basis ¼ isolate susceptibility pattern ⁄ antibiogram)
Species (no. of isolates)
Duplicate
isolates (%)
Antibiotic
considered
% resistance
Duplicate
included
Duplicate
excluded
E. coli (5253) 20 Nalidixic acid 13 11
P. aeruginosa (2154) 43 Ciprofloxacin 51 46
S. aureus (3684) 48 Oxacillin 36 29
Data from [17] and Groupe Hospitalier Pitie´-Saltpe´trie`re, Paris, France (unpub-
lished data).
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isolate is a species–antibiotype combination that
has not been included previously in the database
for a particular patient. A duplicate isolate is a
species–antibiotype combination that does not
differ—within the limits set below—from an
isolate already included in the database for a
particular patient. Elimination occurs regardless
of the time between isolates. The effect on resist-
ance rates of antibiogram-based duplicate isolate
exclusion is shown in Table 3.
Two strains isolated from the same patient are
considered different if their antibiotypes show at
least one major difference (S ﬁ R, R ﬁ S).
Minor differences of either the I ﬁ R or the
R ﬁ I type may reflect only the variable phen-
otypic expression of a given resistance mechan-
ism, or even a methodological problem (e.g.,
inoculum size). Conversely, minor differences of
either the S ﬁ I or the I ﬁ S type may reflect
real differences between strains. Examples of the
main differences to be taken into account for
identifying duplicate isolates are listed in Table 4.
To avoid bias, susceptibility tests should ideally
include marker antibiotics that can unequivocally
reveal major differences (e.g., impaired suscepti-
bility to classical quinolones—such as nalidixic
acid—that clearly points to reduced activity of the
newer fluoroquinolones). These markers must be
selected specifically for each microorganism.
When such markers cannot be used, the number
and nature of the minor differences used to
identify duplicate isolates must be specified accu-
rately in the surveillance methodology.
Choosing the susceptibility pattern as the cri-
terion for eliminating duplicates can reveal selec-
tion of resistance occurring within the observation
period, giving a more realistic view of each
patient’s pathological course than when using
the isolation rank. However, it is less objective
and reproducible, since it requires experienced
input and special care to avoid methodological
errors in routine susceptibility testing by busy,
understaffed departments [39].
Advantages and disadvantages of using antibiogram
pattern or isolation rank for identifying duplicate
isolates
The rates of resistance generated using antibio-
gram pattern and isolation rank seem to be similar
in many cases (Table 5). However, the definition
based on isolation rank leads to an underestimate
of the number of infectious events, at least in the
hospital setting, and for species (e.g., MRSA)
causing nosocomial colonisation or infections
(Table 6). In addition, isolation rank does not
account for selection of resistant mutants during
therapy (e.g., S. aureus, P. aeruginosa or Ent. cloacae),
or for successive colonisation or infection with
different strains of the same species. In comparison
with the antibiogram pattern method, the number
of events can be underestimated by 10–40%
according to the species (Table 7), thus limiting
the use of these data for assessing actual frequen-
cies of resistant isolates, which is one of the
important tasks of surveillance [21]. Thus, while
the definition based on isolation rank represents
a useful indication for appropriate empirical
Table 4. Major (‘M’, namely S ﬁ R and R ﬁ S) and
minor (‘m’, namely S ﬁ I and I ﬁ S) differences in
antibiotic susceptibility patterns that can be used to identify
duplicate isolates of Escherichia coli, Pseudomonas aeruginosa,
Staphylococcus aureus and Streptococcus pneumoniae
Difference in pattern
E. coli
Ampicillin–amoxycillin M
Ticarcillin M or m
Third-generation cephalosporins (ESBL production) M or m
Gentamicin, tobramycin, netilmicin, amikacin M or m
Tetracyclines M or m
Co-trimoxazole M
First-generation quinolones M
P. aeruginosa
Ticarcillin M or m
Ceftazidime M or m
Imipenem M or m
Tobramycin, amikacin M or m
Ciprofloxacin M
S. aureus
Penicillin (penicillinase production) M
Oxacillin (specific tests) M
Kanamycin (tobramycin, amikacin) M
Gentamicin M
Erythromycin M
Tetracyclines M
Rifampicin M or m
Fusidic acid M or m
Strep. pneumoniae
Penicillin (MIC) M or m
Erythromycin M
Chloramphenicol M
Tetracyclines M
Table 5. Duplicate isolates: rates of resistance generated
using isolation rank or susceptibility pattern
Species ⁄ antibiotic (no. of isolates)
% resistance
All
Duplicates
excluded by
Rank Pattern
Strep. pneumoniae ⁄penicillin G (173) 47 46 46
S. aureus ⁄ oxacillin (1094) 37 27 28
Ent. cloacae ⁄ cefotaxime (583) 31 26 27
P. aeruginosa ⁄ imipenem (1069) 20 15 19
Groupe Hospitalier Pitie´-Salpe´trie`re, Paris, France (unpublished data).
Cornaglia et al. European recommendations for antimicrobial resistance surveillance 363
 2004 Copyright by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 10, 349–383
therapy (based on the resistance pattern of the first
isolate), this information should be compared with
the susceptibility patterns of subsequent isolates
from the same patient during a hospital stay.
Definitions based on other criteria
Several other systems have been evaluated for
their ability to identify duplicate isolates. Some
rely on analysis of each patient chart: (1) counting
only the most susceptible isolate; (2) counting
only the most resistant isolate; (3) calculating a
patient’s own ‘rate of susceptibility’. Others rely
on considering successive periods of time for each
patient (e.g., periods of 7 days, 30 days, etc.)
separately, and then counting only the first isolate
for each of these periods [38]. Such systems are
neither simple nor more accurate than others for
counting distinct events, and therefore are not
recommended.
S P E C I E S I N C L U D E D O R P O O L E D I N
S T A T I S T I C S
Selecting the bacterial species to be monitored
The choice of which bacterial species to monitor
depends on many criteria. It would seem reason-
able to limit monitoring activity to the main
species of medical interest, except when surveil-
lance has to achieve very specific targets. These
species are, first, those isolated most frequently
(e.g., E. coli, S. aureus) and, second, those which
are encountered less commonly, but which are
responsible for important contagious diseases
(e.g., Neisseria meningitidis, Shigella spp.). When
surveillance focuses on specific well-documented
infections, it is important to take into account all
species (even the less frequent ones) involved in
the infection monitored.
It should be remembered that ‘surveillance’
isolates are sometimes obtained from ad-hoc
cultures that are taken for the purpose of deter-
mining if a patient is harbouring a particular
organism, and not from cultures that are taken as
part of the routine clinical evaluation of a
patient’s illness. These isolates introduce a fre-
quent bias, and should not be included in the
report. Bacterial species monitored normally in
ambulatory patients and in healthcare facilities
are listed in Tables 8 and 9, respectively.
Surveillance and speciation
Lack of careful identification to the species level
may undermine the results of antibiotic resistance
surveillance programmes, and constitutes one of
the major obstacles to automated recovery of data
from clinical laboratories for surveillance purpo-
ses. Surveillance at the genus level is frequently
meaningless. Even for ‘groups of species’ such as
viridans streptococci or coagulase-negative sta-
phylococci, the results may be difficult to inter-
pret. Isolates should be identified to the species
level. Pathovars may be warranted in specific
surveys, e.g., when there are noteworthy differ-
ences in the prevalence of resistance according to
pathovars, or when changes in the distribution of
the different pathovars within a given species
(e.g., Salmonella enterica) need to be quantified.
Table 6. Identification of duplicate isolates by isolation
rank or susceptibility pattern
Criteria Automation
Adequate for
% R Event counting
Rank One Easy + –a
Pattern Multiple Possible + +
aEvents that cannot be counted: (1) selection of resistant mutant in the same patient
(e.g., cips ﬁ cpir MRSA; imps ﬁ impr P. aeruginosa; (2) successive isolation of
different strains in the same patient, e.g., community-acquired MSSA followed by
hospital-acquired MRSA.
Table 7. Effect of excluding duplicate isolates by isolation
rank or antibiogram pattern, and the resulting underesti-
mation of events obtained with the former method
Species (no. of isolates)
Resulting events
when duplicates are
excluded by
Calculated
underestimation
of events (rank
vs. pattern)Rank Pattern
Strep. pneumoniae (173) 122 123 0%
S. aureus (1094) 526 620 18%
Ent. cloacae (583) 329 368 12%
P. aeruginosa (1069) 400 560 40%
Table 8. Bacterial species to be monitored in ambulatory
patients
Escherichia coli
Proteus mirabilis
Salmonella enterica (including Typhi, Paratyphi, Typhimurium and Enteritidis)
Shigella spp.
Klebsiella pneumoniae and K. oxytoca
Haemophilus influenzae
Campylobacter jejuni ⁄ coli
Neisseria meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae
Moraxella catarrhalis
Staphylococcus aureus
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Streptococcus pyogenes
Streptococcus agalactiae
Enterococcus faecium and Ent. faecalis
Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex
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Accurate species identification and characteri-
sation of the mechanism of resistance to certain
antimicrobial agents may be relevant from the
clinical point of view. In some instances, clinical
failures may be the result of reporting an imposs-
ible (or very rare) species or phenotype, wrong
species identification, or underestimation of a
given resistance mechanism. Another conse-
quence of such mistakes is the nosocomial trans-
mission and spread of certain resistance genes to
more virulent organisms (e.g., vanA to S. aureus)
as a result of a lack of infection control policies. A
well-known example is the case of Enterococcus
spp., and the most frequent mistakes originating
in the clinical microbiology laboratory are listed
in Table 10.
When may data for small numbers of isolates be
pooled? Data from small numbers of isolates may
have limited practical or scientific value. To
improve the significance of the data, the denomin-
ator may be enlarged by: (1) grouping species
together; (2) pooling resistance data from different
clinical or environmental specimen types; (3) pool-
ing data from several observation periods or from
several institutions within a geographical area; and
(4) extending the period of observation. A report
must state clearly if and how data have been
pooled.
No general recommendation on the method to
be used for achieving an adequate sample size can
be given. However, it should be taken into
account that a long period of data collection
may mask temporal trends associated with poss-
ible changes in the prevalence of resistance.
Hence, extending the observation period over an
(arbitrarily chosen) time of >1 year may not be
advisable, and grouping of species or pooling of
data from different healthcare facilities should be
considered. When grouping species or genera
together, the internal comparability with respect
to resistance mechanisms and the probability of
their emergence must always be considered.
Alerting systems and surveillance of rare
resistance phenotypes
Reporting of unusual but potentially important
resistant organisms is one of the most important
goals of antimicrobial resistance surveillance. The
Table 9. Bacterial species to be monitored in healthcare
facilities
Escherichia coli
Proteus mirabilis
Salmonella enterica (including Typhi, Paratyphi, Typhimurium and Enteritidis)
Shigella spp.
Klebsiella pneumoniae and K. oxytoca
Enterobacter cloacae and Enterobacter aerogenes
Serratia marcescens
Citrobacter freundii
Morganella morganii
Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Acinetobacter baumannii
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Burkholderia cepacia
Haemophilus influenzae
Campylobacter coli
Campylobacter jejuni
Neisseria meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae
Moraxella catarrhalis
Staphylococcus aureus
Staphylococcus epidermidis
Staphylococcus haemolyticus
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Streptococcus pyogenes
Enterococcus faecium and Ent. faecalis
Bacteroides fragilis
Clostridium difficile
Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex
Table 10. Frequent mistakes made
when reporting antimicrobial sus-
ceptibilities of Enterococcus spp.
Wrong report Why? Correct report Consequences
Ent. faecalis AmpR
(at 105 inoculum)
Misidentification of
Ent. faecium
Ent. faecium AmpR Probably none
Ent. faecalis AmpS
(if Bla+)
Presence of b-lactamase
(not described in Europe)
Ent. faecalis Bla+ Therapeutic failure!
Important consequences if
patient has endocarditis
Ent. faecalis Q-DS Inconsistent phenotype Ent. faecalis Q-DR Therapeutic failure!
Ent. durans VanR Misidentification of
E. faecium (some
E. faecium are
asaccharolytic)
Ent. faecium VanR Under-reporting of the isolate
VanC-carrying species
not tested for
glycopeptide
susceptibility
Presence of vanA or
vanB besides vanC
Ent. gallinarum
vanA or vanB
Important consequences if
patient has endocarditis
1. Nosocomial transmission
2. Spread to other
Gram-positive bacteria
Vancomycin-susceptible
enterococcus (VSE)
Undetected presence of
vanA, vanB, vanD, vanE,
or vanG
Vancomycin-resistant
enterococcus (VRE)
Therapeutic failure!
Important consequences if
patient has endocarditis
1. Nosocomial transmission
2. Spread to other
Gram-positive bacteria
Q-D, quinupristin–dalfopristin.
Cornaglia et al. European recommendations for antimicrobial resistance surveillance 365
 2004 Copyright by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 10, 349–383
availability and awareness of this list in clinical
microbiology laboratories should be considered
as part of the desirable quality control (and good
laboratory practice) of these facilities.
Such a list of ‘wanted’ resistant organisms ⁄
resistance mechanisms, to be disseminated among
laboratories, should include, for instance:
• high-level penicillin resistance in Neisseria men-
ingitidis;
• penicillin resistance in Strep. pyogenes;
• very-high-level penicillin resistance (MIC >
8 mg ⁄L) in Strep. pneumoniae;
• high-level vancomycin resistance in S. aureus;
• presence in Enterobacteriaceae of extended-
spectrum b-lactamases not inhibited by current
inhibitors;
• presence in Enterobacteriaceae of carbapene-
mases;
• b-lactamase inhibitor resistance in Haemophilus
influenzae;
• high-level penicillin resistance in Ent. faecalis;
• gentamicin or ampicillin resistance in Listeria
monocytogenes;
• cefotaxime or fluoroquinolone resistance in
Salmonella enterica Typhi or Paratyphi.
Alert reporting can be established as a two-
level system. The first (immediate) alert does not
require full understanding of the mechanism
involved, and should be considered as precau-
tionary reporting, to be modified if the observa-
tion is not confirmed by more in-depth
investigation. The alerting laboratory should be
capable of keeping the resistant strain viable and
giving it priority in its research activities. Fur-
thermore, the strain should be made available to
specialised research groups if it is of interest, for a
better understanding of its features and ⁄ or for
controlling its spread.
A N T I B I O T I C S L I S T E D O R P O O L E D I N
S T A T I S T I C S
Surveillance antibiotics
Antibiotics to be included in surveillance studies
should be selected in such a way as to ensure the
highest sensitivity in detecting the possible pres-
ence of a particular antibiotic resistance mechan-
ism. This mechanism can be inferred for each
given species from the MIC of a given antibiotic
or group of antibiotics (‘surveillance antibiotics’).
In a second step, it should be possible to infer,
without further testing, which other antibiotics
are probably inactivated by the same resistance
mechanism. The rules to be applied in this
process constitute the basis of the ‘interpretive
reading of susceptibility testing procedures’ [40],
and should be applied whenever a new antimi-
crobial agent is introduced in the test panel.
So-called ‘expert systems’ embedded in the soft-
ware of automatic susceptibility testing devices
are based on this inductive approach.
In summary, surveillance studies should focus
on the activities of a relatively limited number of
sentinel antimicrobials, but information resulting
from these activities should include a much
broader list of resistances which are likely to
occur with a much larger group of drugs. This
broader list is the one to be proposed to and used
by clinicians and epidemiologists, who do not
necessarily need to be aware of all the details
regarding the method of inference and its appli-
cation. Unfortunately, surveillance studies often
only include data regarding the antibiotics exam-
ined in routine susceptibility tests, and therefore
available in LISs. A frequent problem is whether it
is possible to pool the data obtained with similar
but different antibiotics.
Tables 11–23 suggest appropriate surveillance
antibiotics for different microorganisms, as well
as the antibiotics to which each surveillance
antibiotic might be considered equivalent when
a particular mechanism of resistance is to be
detected (inference of which may differ between
different groups of microorganisms). The list of
possible resistance mechanisms is not exhaustive,
and resistance results often from a combination of
more than one mechanism in the same microor-
ganism.
Expression of resistance and resistance patterns
For some of the bacterium–antibiotic combina-
tions considered in Tables 11–23, the use of
semiquantitative data, i.e., reporting only the
interpretative categories and not the MIC values,
may fail to reveal acquired resistance (i.e., when
strain susceptibility is not decreased to such an
extent as to allow classification as I or R). When
the underlying resistance mechanism is known
and the resistance pattern is well-defined, it is
possible to often detect abnormal behaviour of a
strain by observing its altered susceptibility to
one or more antibiotic(s) of the same family to
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which resistance is more marked (cross-resist-
ance).
For example, it is particularly interesting to
monitor the following bacterium–antibiotic com-
binations indirectly, using the corresponding
‘phenotypic markers’ of resistance:
• E. coli and third-generation cephalosporins:
resistance to first-generation cephalosporins
but susceptibility to ticarcillin identifies cephalo-
Table 11. b-Lactams suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Enterobacteriaceae with low-level chromosomal
constitutive or non-constitutive expression of Class C
b-lactamases (e.g., Escherichia coli, Shigella spp., Salmonella
spp., Proteus mirabilis)
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Ampicillin Amoxycillin Penicillinase
AmpC hyperproduction
Amoxycillin–clavulanate Ampicillin–sulbactam Penicillinase hyperproduction
AmpC hyperproduction
Oxacillinase production
Inhibitor-R b-lactamase
Cefazolin Cephalothin Penicillinase hyperproduction
Cefaclor AmpC hyperproduction
Cefotaxime Ceftriaxone ESBL
Ceftazidime AmpC hyperproduction
Aztreonam
Cefepime
Ceftazidime Ceftriaxone ESBL
Cefotaxime AmpC hyperproduction
Aztreonam
Cefepime
Cefoxitin Cefotetan AmpC hyperproduction
Imipenem Meropenem AmpC hyperproduction
plus reduced permeability
Carbapenemase
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase.
Table 12. b-Lactams suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Enterobacteriaceae producing constitutive chromoso-
mal Class A b-lactamase (e.g., Klebsiella pneumoniae, Klebsi-
ella oxytoca, Citrobacter koseri)
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Piperacillin Penicillinase
ESBL
K-OXY b-lactamase
hyperproduction (K. oxytoca)
Amoxycillin–clavulanate Ampicillin–sulbactam Penicillinase
hyperproduction
Inhibitor-R b-lactamase
Cefotaxime Ceftriaxone ESBL
Ceftazidime K-OXY b-lactamase
Aztreonam hyperproduction (K. oxytoca)
Cefepime
Ceftazidime Ceftriaxone ESBL
Cefotaxime
Aztreonam
Cefepime
Cefoxitin Cefotetan AmpC hyperproduction
Reduced permeability
Aztreonam Ceftriaxone ESBL
Cefotaxime K-OXY b-lactamase
Ceftazidime hyperproduction (K. oxytoca)
Cefepime
Imipenem Meropenem AmpC hyperproduction plus
reduced permeability
Carbapenemase
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase.
Table 13. b-Lactams suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Enterobacteriaceae producing inducible chromosomal
Class C b-lactamase (e.g., Enterobacter cloacae, Enterobacter
aerogenes, Citrobacter freundii, Serratia marcescens, Hafnia
alvei, Morganella morganii, Providencia spp.)
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Ticarcillin Piperacillin Penicillinase
AmpC hyperproduction
ESBL
Cefotaxime Ceftriaxone AmpC hyperproduction
Ceftazidime
Aztreonam ESBL
Cefepime
Ceftazidime Ceftriaxone AmpC hyperproduction
Cefotaxime derepression
Aztreonam ESBL
Cefepime
Cefepime Ceftriaxone AmpC hyperproduction plus
Cefotaxime reduced permeability
Ceftazidime ESBL
Aztreonam
Imipenem Meropenem AmpC hyperproduction plus
reduced permeability
Carbapenemase
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase.
Table 14. b-Lactams suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Enterobacteriaceae producing inducible chromosomal
Class A b-lactamase (e.g., Proteus vulgaris and Proteus
penneri)
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Piperacillin Penicillinase
Class A derepressed b-lactamase
ESBL
Amoxycillin–
clavulanate
Ampicillin–
sulbactam
Penicillinase hyperproduction
Inhibitor-R b-lactamase
Cefotaxime Ceftriaxone Class A derepressed b-lactamase
Ceftazidime ESBL
Aztreonam
Cefepime
Ceftazidime Ceftriaxone Class A derepressed b-lactamase
Cefotaxime ESBL
Aztreonam
Cefepime
Cefoxitin Cefotetan Acquired AmpC-type
cephalosporinase
Reduced permeability
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase.
Table 15. Non-b-lactams suggested as surveillance antibi-
otics for all Enterobacteriaceae
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Gentamicin Aminoglycoside-modifying
enzymes
Netilmicina Gentamicin Reduced permeability
Tobramycina Gentamicin
Amikacin Tobramycin
Netilmicin
Nalidixic acid Quinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Ciprofloxacin Quinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Fluoroquinolones
Co-trimoxazole Changes in enzyme target
Nitrofurantoin Decreased nitrofurantoin
reductase
aPredictor for resistance to gentamicin only in amikacin-susceptible strains.
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sporinase-hyperproducing strains, which exhi-
bit decreased susceptibility to cefotaxime, ceftri-
axone and ceftazidime (MIC 0.25–2 mg ⁄L).
• Enterobacteriaceae and fluoroquinolones:
resistance to classical quinolones (e.g., nalidixic
acid) identifies strains with low-level resistance
Table 16. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Surveillance antibiotic Predictive for: Main resistance mechanisms
Ticarcillin Piperacillin AmpC hyperproduction
Penicillinase
Efflux
Ceftazidime Cefepime AmpC hyperproduction
Aztreonam Efflux
Imipenem Meropenem AmpC hyperproduction
plus reduced permeability
Carbapenemase
Meropenem Imipenem AmpC hyperproduction
plus reduced permeability
Efflux
Carbapenemase
Ciprofloxacin Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutations
(and ⁄ or efflux)
Netilmicina Gentamicin Aminoglycoside-modifying
enzymes
Tobramycina Gentamicin Reduced permeability
Amikacin Tobramycin
aPredictor for resistance to gentamicin only in amikacin-susceptible strains.
Table 17. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Acinetobacter baumannii
Surveillance antibiotic Predictive for: Main resistance mechanisms
Imipenem Meropenem Reduced permeability
Carbapenemase
Oxacillinase
PBP modification
Ciprofloxacin Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Gentamicin Aminoglycoside-modifying
enzymes
Tobramycina Gentamicin Reduced permeability
Amikacin Efflux
aPredictor for resistance to gentamicin only in amikacin-susceptible strains.
PBP, penicillin-binding protein.
Table 18. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Staphylococcus aureus
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Penicillin Ampicillin Penicillinase
Amoxycillin
Piperacillin
Oxacillin All b-lactamsa PBP2a
Vancomycin Teicoplanin Thick cell wall
VanA
Gentamicin Tobramycin Aminoglycoside-modifying
enzymes
Netilmicin
Amikacin
Netilmicin Amikacin
Tobramycin Netilmicin
Amikacin
Kanamycin Neomycin
Amikacin
Erythromycin Clarithromycin Ribosomal methylation
Azithromycin Efflux
Other macrolides
Lincomycin Clindamycin Ribosomal methylation
Inactivating enzymes
Ciprofloxacin Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Co-trimoxazole Changes in enzyme target
Tetracycline – Efflux
Ribosomal protection
Chloramphenicol – Acetyltransferase
Mupirocin – Altered target
Linezolid – Ribosomal mutation
aMICs should be determined.
Table 19. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Streptococcus pneumoniae
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanism
Penicillin Amoxycillina Modified PBP
Cefotaxime Ceftriaxone Modidifed PBP
Cefepime
Ciprofloxacin Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Erythromycin Azithromycin Ribosomal modification
Clarithromycin Efflux
Roxithromycin
Telithromycin Ribosomal modification
Efflux
Co-trimoxazole Changes in enzyme target
Tetracycline Efflux
Ribosomal protection
Chloramphenicol Acetyltransferase
Linezolid Ribosomal mutation
aMICs should be determined.
PBP, penicillin-binding protein.
Table 20. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Enterococcus spp.
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Ampicillin Penicillin
Piperacillin
PBP modification
Carbapenem PBP overproduction
Gentamicin (HLR) Amikacina Aminoglycoside-modifying
enzymes
Tobramycin
Netilmicin
Streptomycin (HLR) Aminoglycoside-modifying
enzymes
Ribosomal modification
Ciprofloxacin Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Vancomycin Teicoplanin VanA, VanD
Erythromycin Ribosomal methylation
Efflux
Quinupristin–dalfopristinb Modifying enzymes
Ribosomal methylation
(high-level resistance)
Linezolid Ribosomal mutation
aInfrequent isolates may exhibit synergy with amikacin despite high-level resistance
to gentamicin.
bOnly for Ent. faecium.
HLR, high-level resistance; PBP, penicillin-binding protein.
Table 21. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Streptococcus pyogenes
Surveillance antibiotic Predictor for: Main resistance mechanisms
Penicillin
Ciprofloxacin Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Erythromycin Ribosomal methylation
Efflux
Telithromycin Ribosomal modification
Efflux
Tetracycline Efflux
Ribosomal protection
Chloramphenicol Chloramphenicol acetyltransferase
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to newer antibiotics of this family. This helps to
monitor the evolution of rates of resistance to
fluoroquinolones [41].
Possible bias in reporting
Some laboratories perform second-level suscepti-
bility tests with selected antimicrobial agents on
isolates that demonstrate resistance initially to
one screening agent (or method) only. Further-
more, some second-line antimicrobial agents are
only tested routinely against isolates resistant to
agents used more widely. Any calculation of the
susceptible percentage based on these selected
subsets of isolates would bias the results towards
higher levels of resistance.
Another frequent question is whether ‘cascade’
or selective reporting rules should be applied to
reports, i.e., reporting secondary agents only if the
isolate is resistant to the primary agent(s) of a
specific drug class. Whatever decision is taken
with regard to internal reports, which must take
into account the local clinicians’ ability to under-
stand the implications of the report fully, it is
important to ensure that all stored data—and not
just those reported to clinicians—are analysed for
epidemiological purposes. When only isolates
resistant to primary agents are analysed, then
results for secondary agents are biased towards
higher levels of resistance.
F R E Q U E N C Y O F D A T A A N A L Y S I S
How frequently should the cumulative
susceptibility data be reported?
Surveillance studies are frequently based on com-
paring resistance over successive time periods.
Comparing data over short time intervals is advan-
tageous in surveillance studies, both in theory and
in practice. Studies based on time-series have
shown the superiority of short time intervals
(months) for some epidemiological purposes,
including studies of the relationship between the
use of antibiotics and antibiotic resistance [42].
Furthermore, surveillance should be designed for,
or related to, an effective alert system, and there-
fore ‘the sooner the alert, the better’. However, the
actual frequency of cumulative susceptibility re-
ports may vary according to a number of factors.
These factors include the availability of sufficient,
reliable data within a given period, the specific
purpose of the surveillance (e.g., guiding empirical
therapy, alert function, assessing the impact of
therapeutic or preventive strategies, educational
goals), accessibility of rapid means of distribution
and circulation (peer-reviewed articles, institu-
tional bulletins, regular internal reports, Intranet,
Internet), or even funding problems.
If the main purpose of surveillance is guiding
therapy in the hospital setting or in the commu-
nity, or to give a general report of the resistance
problem at local, national or international levels,
it is sufficient usually to analyse data which have
been collected over longer periods of time. How-
ever, if the surveillance system entails an alert
function, it is necessary to analyse the data more
frequently and to report whenever a relevant
change has occurred. The emergence of unusual
or rare resistance patterns, or of new mechanisms
of resistance, would mandate immediate report-
ing. To assess the impact of interventions, the
time and frequency of analysing and reporting
must be related clearly to the action to be
undertaken (pre-interventional, post-interven-
tional, follow-up). Easy access to rapid electronic
means for spreading information should facilitate
the distribution of surveillance reports and the
timely utilisation of data.
In order to provide data as a guide to empirical
therapy, different cumulative susceptibility reports
should be generated for each healthcare facility
Table 22. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Haemophilus influenzae
Surveillance antibiotic Predictive for: Main resistance mechanisms
Ampicillin Amoxycillin Penicillinase
Amoxycillin–clavulanate PBP modification and ⁄ or penicillinase
Cefotaxime Ceftriaxone ESBL
Cefixime
Nalidixic acid Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutation
Vancomycin Teicoplanin VanA, VanD
Azithromycin Clarithromycin Efflux
Co-trimoxazole Change in enzyme target
Tetracycline Efflux
Ribosomal protection
Chloramphenicol Chloramphenicol
acetyltransferase
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase; PBP, penicillin-binding protein.
Table 23. Antibiotics suggested as surveillance antibiotics
for Neisseria meningitidis
Surveillance antibiotic Predictive for: Main resistance mechanisms
Penicillin Penicillinase
PBP modification
Cefotaxime Ceftriaxone PBP modification
Ciprofloxacin Fluoroquinolones Topoisomerase mutation
PBP, penicillin-binding protein.
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served by a laboratory. For this purpose, it has
been recommended to analyse and report data on
at least a yearly basis [38]. When a large number
of strains of a species or group of microorganisms
have been tested, more frequent analyses may be
carried out. It has, however, been argued that
more frequent reporting may be confounded by
seasonal variations.
Yearly reporting may also be appropriate if the
aim of surveillance is to assess the scale of the
resistance problem at the local, national or inter-
national levels. The surveillance standards recom-
mended by the WHO [21] suggest at least yearly
reports at the national and international levels
(‘intermediate ⁄ central level’). For monitoring changes
in resistance rates, and for detecting the emergence
and the spread of new resistances, yearly reporting
will probably cause an unacceptable delay in the
diffusion of important information. Hence, more
frequent presentation of data is required. The
WHO [21] recommends a daily review of unusual
or important results at the local level (‘peripheral
level’), a weekly-to-monthly review of organism
frequencies and resistance profiles for outbreaks,
and a quarterly review of data for monitoring
resistance trends, and a review of hospital usage
policy. At the intermediate and central levels,
quarterly reviews of pooled data for monitoring
resistance trends by organism, antibiotic, geo-
graphical and demographic parameters, as well
as a quarterly review of resistance results for possible
errors in laboratory performance, are proposed.
The EARSS also collects national resistance data
on invasive isolates quarterly, and gives a quar-
terly feedback to the national representatives,
who are responsible for distributing information
on important or unexpected results, as well as on
unclear or doubtful data, to the individual labor-
atories. A report for a broader public is prepared
once a year [9].
In order to quantify the effectiveness of inter-
ventions aimed at curtailing resistance, the time
and frequency of analysis and reporting must be
related clearly to the action taken. In general, data
of the pre-interventional and the post-interven-
tional periods, as well as those of at least one
follow-up period, should be provided. Whatever
the type and frequency of the report, it is essential
that the information be as timely as possible and
that delays in dissemination be avoided [43,44].
Do small numbers of isolates imply imprecise
statistics?
If the number of observations is small, resist-
ance rates may be biased easily—upwards or
downwards—by the features of a handful of
isolates. The debate about the threshold to be
applied for reporting small numbers of isolates
is still open. In the NCCLS Guidelines [38], a
minimum of ten strains is required for separate
reporting, with a proposal to use a threshold of
at least 25 strains having been rejected. As a
rationale for setting the minimum at 25 strains,
it was argued that, for example, the impact of
two resistant strains in a sample of ten is much
greater than in a sample of 25 (resistance rates
of 20% and 8%, respectively). However, both
figures, namely ten and 25, are completely
arbitrary. Such small numbers of observations
are generally not suitable for comparison of
resistance rates between different settings or
periods of time, since random fluctuations of
uncertain significance will occur readily. A more
accurate example for estimating the sample
sizes needed for documenting increasing or
decreasing antimicrobial resistance frequencies
is given in the WHO document ‘Surveillance
Standards for Antimicrobial Resistance’ [21]. It
is of crucial importance to report the exact
number of observations on which resistance
rates are based, i.e., the number of strains tested
for each antibiotic listed in the report. Inclusion
of confidence intervals helps to interpret results
based on small-sized samples.
Does perception of important clinical changes
imply more frequent analysis?
One of the main purposes of resistance surveil-
lance is to detect variations in the susceptibility
level of microorganisms to antimicrobials, and to
make an interested public aware of clinically or
epidemiologically relevant changes. Perception of
clinically important changes, be it the emergence
and spread of new resistances or the increasing
(or decreasing) prevalence of already known
resistance patterns, should imply careful evalua-
tion of previous data and frequent analysis of
newly collected information in order to verify
presumed trends.
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Do seasonal variations in resistance rates
complicate the presentation of data?
Seasonal variations in resistance rates have been
reported, particularly for pathogens causing com-
munity-acquired lower respiratory tract infec-
tions. Consistent with studies published
previously, EARSS data [9] show a peak of
invasive Strep. pneumoniae isolates around the
turn of the year, a constant decline in isolates until
August, and a subsequent regular increase in the
autumn and winter months. The proportion of
penicillin-non-susceptible Strep. pneumoniae
(PNSSP) isolates tends to be higher in the summer
months; however, this difference is not statisti-
cally significant. The variations in PNSSP propor-
tions, and their higher prevalence in August, are
as yet unexplained. Although seasonal variations
in resistance rates for particular pathogens may
not reflect real changes in the level of resistance,
they at least complicate, and possibly bias, any
presentation of data on a more frequent basis than
1 year, particularly for small-size samples.
Do larger numbers of isolates imply more
frequent analysis?
Although it is true that inaccurate statistics
related to small sample sizes often discourage
frequent or stratified analysis, the availability of
data on a larger number of strains does not imply
necessarily that data should be presented more
frequently. As discussed above, the frequency of
reporting should be defined primarily according
to the purpose of the surveillance. Detection of
resistance trends is easier when more numerous
data are evaluated frequently and reported (e.g.,
increased fluoroquinolone resistance in E. coli),
while detection and reporting of unexpected or
new resistances should not be influenced greatly
by the amount of data available. In the latter
case, an alert system would allow timely infor-
mation, leading to prompt epidemiological inter-
vention.
A larger amount of data could also prove useful
for obtaining better stratification (e.g., data from
ICUs as compared to those from other services,
data from different specimen types, data from
different age groups). Hence, when selecting the
report periodicity, an assessment should be made
as to whether additional stratification of data or
more frequent reporting is appropriate.
Cross-sectional surveillance studies
For frequent pathogens, many studies are organ-
ised on the basis of collecting all isolates of this
pathogen on a particular day from hospital (or
community or ICU) patients. For less frequent
isolates, the collection may be extended over
3 days or 1 week. These periodic cross-sectional
studies permit evolutionary analysis to be con-
ducted, and may be useful for obtaining a fixed
image of the prevalence of resistance in a given
organism or in a small group of organisms. A
major advantage of this method is that the
laboratories enrolled in the surveillance program
are not burdened by the task of ad-hoc analysis.
Hence, this short-time recovery method generally
assures full recovery of strains and offers a non-
biased sample. The strains should be collected at
the laboratory by the surveillance team, and
analysed in a central reference laboratory to
assure comparability of results.
F O R M A T F O R D A T A P R E S E N T A T I O N
Reporting antimicrobial resistance is generally
considered necessary to allow selection of empir-
ical therapy based on local data for: (1) assessing
the scale of the resistance problem at the local,
national or international levels; (2) monitoring
changes in resistance rates; (3) detecting the
emergence and spread of new resistances; and
(4) providing a measure of the effectiveness of any
interventions aimed at reducing resistance [45].
Circulation of reports
It is essential that results be reported as rapidly as
possible to as wide an audience as is thought
appropriate, including all those involved in anti-
microbial testing, prescribing, supplying and
auditing. It is also worth recalling that any
information gathered from a surveillance system,
although collated centrally, must be reported back
to its providers, i.e., those who generated and
submitted the basic data.
Earlier surveillance studies tended to rely upon
yearly reports, presentations at international sym-
posia, and publications in peer-review journals,
all of which are relatively slow processes, but the
growth in use of the Internet and the World Wide
Web makes information accessible much more
easily than previously [44]. Presentation on a
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website would probably meet most needs for
circulation of reports, but a printed version
should always be available for wider diffusion
and prompt consultation. Such a printed report
should be designed mainly to meet clinicians’
needs, and should be printed in a format that the
clinician finds easy to access and understand. A
foldout card and a laminated page to be placed at
the front of each new patient file have proved
useful [38].
Stratification of data, even within the same
healthcare facility, may be useful in answering
questions and in guiding clinicians in empirical
therapy decisions [38], but can also split the data
into more homogeneous subsets, which are com-
parable more readily between studies. This may
take the form of a separate report to individual
user groups rather than being part of the whole
cumulative antimicrobial susceptibility report.
Examples of stratification criteria include:
• clinical service or ward grouping;
• specific ward, clinic or unit;
• specimen type;
• age groups;
• special patient populations (e.g., cystic fibrosis,
haematological malignancies).
Information to be included in the report
The time schedules adopted in producing the
report should be indicated, as well as the date
of issue and periodicity of the report. If data
have been stratified and appear in separate
reports, the ward, unit and specimen (or any-
thing else) that the present report refers to
should be stated clearly. All other available
reports should be listed, with all relevant
information about their availability, in order to
allow comparison between a specific unit and
other units or total hospital susceptibility data.
Information on units other than those that the
report refers to may be subject to restrictions in
accordance with an individual hospital’s privacy
policies.
A note should be made when a new analytical
method has been used to generate the data, or a
new denominator (e.g., a different ward grouping
or different ward composition) has been applied
to calculate the figures, and comparison with
previous reports must be made with caution.
In table headings, complete antimicrobial
names should be used when possible. If space is
an issue, legend keys should be given in a
footnote.
Further information reported should include:
• types of specimens considered (e.g., blood,
cerebrospinal fluid, urine, respiratory, all);
• level and accuracy of microorganism identifi-
cation (genus, species, subspecification, type);
• if organisms have been grouped, an exact
description of species and genera, including
pooling criteria;
• method of resistance testing, MIC breakpoints,
interpretative criteria;
• whenever possible, information on infection,
colonisation, surveillance culture;
• quality assurance.
Comparison of data from different sources
A proper comparison of data between wards,
hospitals or geographical areas (at the local,
national and international levels, as well as over
time) is indispensable for analysing trends and
emerging problems. Unfortunately, information
needed for such comparisons is often scarce or not
provided at all. As a result, data on non-homo-
geneous populations (e.g., those including mostly
outpatients vs. those including mostly ICU or
haematological patients) are often compared,
resulting in completely erroneous conclusions.
It would be advisable to list in every report the
percentage composition of the data sources or, at
least, the percentages of those coming from
outpatients, inpatients (excluding ICUs) and
ICUs, respectively. These three main categories
could be stratified further (e.g., by detailing the
individual wards encompassed by the term ‘inpa-
tients’, or by singling out wards with a high
resistance incidence, such as haematology, or by
admitting patients with specific patholo-
gies—such as cystic fibrosis—or age ranges—such
as geriatric or paediatric patients). This way of
‘labelling’ the data would permit easier compar-
ison of resistance rates in different reports, inclu-
ding those presented in published studies, posters
or oral presentations, and rapid identification of
different categories (e.g., those laboratories pro-
cessing many outpatient specimens, or those
lacking an ICU). This would be all the more
effective if expressed in graphical format (e.g., a
bar or a pie chart indicating the main wards with
different standard colours or grey levels). If
stratification is kept to a minimum, distinguishing
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between outpatients, inpatients and ICUs would
in itself provide very useful information.
The report format
Reports can be compiled by manual data input or
can be generated automatically. Automated and
semi-automated systems for antimicrobial suscep-
tibility testing [46] can produce standardised or
customised patient test reports generated by com-
puter software packages that are referred to as data
management systems (DMS). The DMS package
usually contains an epidemiology component,
which can archive results, thereby providing spe-
cialised reports, organism trend reports and anti-
biograms. To optimise the availability and
transcription accuracy of rapid patient reports,
integrated data from automated and semi-automa-
ted systems can be transferred through a computer
interface to the LIS. An additional level of integra-
tion can be provided by software packages that
allow interfacing with a pharmacy system, so that
the microbiology results can be matched against a
patient’s record of antimicrobial therapy.
An additional level of enhancement in automa-
ted systems is referred to as ‘expert software’,
which examines and validates the antimicrobial
susceptibility profile or phenotype of an individ-
ual isolate. These expert systems use specific rules
or algorithms (pre-programed or user-defined) to
flag unlikely resistance patterns and recommend
changes. Expert software may also predict cross-
resistance to other antimicrobial agents, and can
facilitate the addition of footnotes or comments to
a patient’s report regarding the resistance pattern.
Qualitative definition of denominator data (e.g.,
what kind of population is being sampled) is
essential. Wherever possible, rates should be
expressed in terms of cases within a defined human
population over a defined time period. Since the
submission of microbiological specimens for ana-
lysis is inconsistent and varies widely, the use of
laboratory specimens and isolates as denominators
produces rates that are of limited epidemiological
relevance unless linked to disease incidence.
Statistical handling of surveillance data is
difficult. Many standard approaches to sampling
human populations are not relevant because the
target population in surveillance studies is highly
variable and not consistent. In general, it is not
possible to establish a ‘sampling frame’, and
techniques used in ecology might be more appro-
priate. Sampling methods for surveillance studies
have been compared with those used for more
conventional surveys in a recent paper [44].
Expression of data as truly qualitative test results
For a few bacterium–antibiotic combinations,
susceptibility tests are truly qualitative and are
designed to detect the presence of a given resist-
ance mechanism, such as:
• S. aureus resistant to all b-lactam agents, by the
detection of microcolonies in the inhibition
zone surrounding an oxacillin disk in specific
growth conditions (salt, temperature), or PBP2a
detection by immunoenzymatic methods or
mecA gene detection;
• H. influenzae or S. aureus resistant to penicillins,
by the detection of b-lactamases with enzymatic
methods;
• Enterobacteriaceae resistant to third-generation
cephalosporins, by the detection of ESBL pro-
duction (double-disk synergy or other similar
test).
Semiquantitative vs. quantitative data
A variety of different methods are used for
susceptibility testing, but it is now accepted
widely that all susceptibility data should be
generated as quantitative endpoints regardless
of the method. This mandates measurement of
disk diffusion zone diameters to the nearest
whole millimetre, and the expression of MIC
endpoints in mg ⁄L for dilution methods.
The commonest measure for bacterial sensitiv-
ity is the MIC, a measure that describes partly the
pharmacodynamics of an antibiotic, although it
ignores its bactericidal activity, which is also of
great importance for the clinical value of an
antimicrobial drug. Because of the ease of asses-
sing the MIC, it is common practice to use MIC
data to describe the antibacterial activity of a drug
towards a bacterium, or the sensitivity of a
bacterium to a drug. To make antimicrobial
therapy applicable, and to avoid treatment of
infections with inappropriate drugs, MIC data can
be grouped into well-established interpretative
categories, limited by cut-off values or break-
points. Thus, interpretative categories must be
referred to as ‘semiquantitative’ (and not truly
qualitative) reporting of data.
To avoid misunderstandings, clear-cut defini-
tions are needed, and any report including sus-
ceptibility tests performed by different
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laboratories needs to be subjected to careful
evaluation of differences that might relate to
methods and breakpoints rather than to true
differences in resistance [45,47].
MIC cut-off values and breakpoints should
fulfil three criteria, namely epidemiological, phar-
macological and clinical criteria. MIC breakpoints
differ between countries, mostly because the
respective national working committees attribute
different importance to the two latter criteria.
EUCAST makes a clear distinction between clin-
ical breakpoints (which define clinically suscept-
ible, clinically intermediate and clinically resistant
isolates, and which can be altered by changes in
circumstances such as an acquired resistance
mechanism) and epidemiological cut-off values
(which focus on separating the resistant strains
from the wild-type strains, and which are not
altered by changing circumstances such as an
acquired resistance mechanism) [45,47].
For many bacterium–antibiotic combinations,
acquired resistance leads to a pattern easily
distinguishable from the wild-type strain, so
semiquantitative data would appear to be ade-
quate for monitoring resistance. Some examples
are listed in Table 24. Interpretative categories are
of particular importance when reporting on bac-
terial resistance within a hospital, since clinicians
make daily use of S ⁄ I ⁄R results to prescribe
antibiotic therapies.
If differences in susceptibility test methods and
in breakpoints make it difficult to compare sem-
iquantitative data from different geographical
regions and different published studies [45], bias
and errors are of particular concern even within a
given report. It is not infrequent to have, in the
same laboratory, antimicrobial susceptibility tests
performed by different methods (either manual or
automated) according to different specimens,
workload and workflow, or individual prefer-
ences. Different automated systems—or automa-
ted readers of manually performed tests—may
have different breakpoints embedded in their
software, or different software releases, or may
have been updated manually at different times.
While these considerations have an impact on the
internal correctness and coherence of the report,
comparing susceptibility results from different
wards in the same hospital is a risky operation in
that it does not take account of the huge differ-
ences existing as regards distribution of bacterial
species, use of medical and surgical devices,
underlying conditions of patients, and use of
antimicrobials.
Reporting semiquantitative data
Data expressed as S ⁄ I ⁄R can be either tabulated or
reported as graphs. Since breakpoints refer to
given MIC values, these data are sometimes
referred to as ‘semiquantitative’ rather than
‘qualitative’. The simplest way of reporting qual-
itative—or semiquantitative—data is by present-
ing them as a table, listing the number of isolates
tested, and the number and ⁄ or percentage of
susceptible, intermediate and resistant strains.
However, many reports only list one interpretat-
ive category, which sometimes makes it possible
to compare many years of survey in different
columns without compromising the overall read-
ability of the report.
When only one interpretative category is
listed, data can also be arranged in a cumulative
antimicrobial susceptibility report [38], listing the
microorganisms on the y-axis and the percent-
ages susceptible to all tested antimicrobials on
the x-axis; the number of tested isolates can also
be placed on the x-axis, provided that all
compounds have been tested on the same num-
ber of isolates. The statement that not testing a
Table 24. Main bacterium-antibiotic combinations for
which semiquantitative data can monitor resistance ade-
quately
E. coli, P. mirabilis, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp.
First-generation quinolones
Tetracyclines
Aminopenicillins
Carboxypenicillins
Sulphonamides
Gentamicin
Trimethoprim
K. pneumoniae
Gentamicin
First-generation quinolones
Tetracyclines
Sulphonamides
Trimethoprim
Ent. cloacae, Ent. aerogenes, Serratia
Third-generation cephalosporins
Gentamicin
First-generation quinolones
P. aeruginosa
Ticarcillin
Ceftazidime
Imipenem
Ciprofloxacin
S. aureus
Erythromycin
Gentamicin
Tetracyclines
Sulphonamides
Fluoroquinolones
Strep. pneumoniae
Erythromycin
Chloramphenicol
Tetracyclines
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subset of isolates (e.g., urine isolates) against all
drugs is not likely to affect the clinical relevance
of the cumulative report [38] is debatable; in
such an instance, separate subset tables would be
preferable.
Susceptibility rates equal to zero should be
distinguished clearly from the possibility that the
drug has not been tested, since in a database
numerical field both cases may be represented by
the figure ‘0’.
Data may be grouped by microorganism (and
reported on several consecutive lines headed by
the name of the antibiotic tested), or by antibiotic
(and reported on several consecutive lines headed
by the name of the microorganism tested). Micro-
organisms can be listed alphabetically, by organ-
ism group or by prevalence, but the alphabetical
list is usually preferred. Listing by group can be
helpful when comparing resistance between rela-
ted microorganisms which often belong to the
same genus and are also close to one another in
the alphabetical list.
Antimicrobials can be listed alphabetically, by
class or by rank (1st, 2nd, 3rd choice). Ranking
antimicrobials may also lead to reporting lower-
rank antibiotics (broader spectra, more costly,
more toxic) only if a microorganism is resistant
to primary agents within a given class (or even
within the whole formulary). This ‘cascade report-
ing’ applies only to reports to be used in clinical
settings to assist clinicians in selecting the most
appropriate agents for antimicrobial therapy. In
more comprehensive epidemiological reports,
careful analysis of all data generated by antimicro-
bial susceptibility tests is essential for the timely
detection of trends in emerging resistance [38].
It must always be made clear whether the
intermediate isolates are reported independently
or pooled with the resistant or—far less com-
monly—with the susceptible strains. If the inter-
mediate isolates are pooled with the resistant
isolates, this pool should be referred to as ‘non-
susceptible’. Such groupings are often used by
analogy to clinical findings (as is the case with
PNSSP), but it is also worth noting that this
procedure can smooth out the differences existing
between different national breakpoints. The ex-
tent of agreement on susceptible breakpoints (S ⁄ I)
is often greater than that on resistant ones (I ⁄R),
and pooling intermediate and resistant isolates in
a single group of ‘non-susceptible’ isolates may
reduce the bias when international data are
compared. However, in a few instances, break-
points categorise the wild-type organisms of a
species as intermediate (or indeterminate), in
which case the intermediate category must be
analysed together with the susceptible category,
since these microorganisms are not endowed with
any acquired resistance mechanism.
The use of graphics in reporting semiquantitative
data
Graphs may permit a swifter appreciation of
differences between resistance levels to different
antibiotics, between different microorganisms, or
over different time periods, thereby giving a
comprehensive overview of resistance distribu-
tion in a given species over time. Susceptibility
evolution over time can be expressed by means
of either linear graphs or bar graphs. Linear
graphs are not entirely suitable, since they
suggest continuous observations, which often is
not the case. More lines, representing different
antibiotics or different microorganisms, can coex-
ist on the same linear graph. The same applies to
bar graphs, where different-coloured bars repre-
sent different antibiotics or microorganisms, but
usually at the expense of poor data clarity. Bars
also allow S ⁄ I ⁄R-values to be combined in a
single bar with multiple colours, thus condensing
complex information in a single graphic element.
The amount of information is even greater with
three-dimensional graphs which present, in the
same chart, susceptibility values for different
microorganisms and ⁄ or for different antibiotics
and ⁄ or over different time periods. This type of
presentation can condense several lines or pages
of a table in a single graph, but overcrowded
pictures can undermine the immediacy and the
efficacy of the presentation. Problems can be
solved by computerised presentations that intro-
duce a few graphic elements at a time, but there
is a risk of shifting from an effective dynamic
presentation to a presentation in which enter-
tainment effects are detrimental to the message
itself.
Labels, figures and ⁄ or percentages may be
unsuitable for a slide presentation in which the
speaker can introduce the most important data
and comment on them, but they should always be
provided in any printed version of the graph,
alongside the number of isolates considered in the
study. All tabulated figures must be reported
when printed graphs are not presented on the
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same page as the original table, or when graphs
completely replace the table.
Another popular method of reporting semi-
quantitative data uses geographical maps in
which the states (or other geographical areas)
are coloured differently according to the different
susceptibility levels. This may result in very
effective reporting of large-scale studies, but
normally permits the representation of only one
variable at a time, usually the ‘national’ resistance
rate. No colour key or susceptibility range is
accepted internationally, but a traffic-light code is
used frequently. Cold colours (green, white or
light grey) are usually chosen to represent lower
resistance rates, while warm colours (purple, red
or black) represent higher rates. A very adequate
way of presenting differences between different
regions is to calculate the standard deviations of
resistance rates in different areas, and present the
+1 and + 2 SDs in warm colours, and the )1 and
)2 SDs in cold colours, reserving white for the
SD. Choosing a limited number of broad resistance
ranges implies that minimal numerical variations
can shift a country from one group to another,
which can be disturbing, especially when maps for
different time periods are compared, and smaller
changes cannot be represented. On the other hand,
a larger number of narrow resistance ranges may
minimise the colour variations from one map to
another, thus making the maps more easily com-
parable. However, the simultaneous presence of
many colour codes on one map makes it somehow
less readable, and things may be even worse if, in
black-and-white prints, grey gradations or texture
patterns are substituted for colours.
Reporting quantitative data
The use of quantitative data may add further
details to what is expressed broadly by means of
interpretative categories. Moreover, in some in-
stances, the mere use of current breakpoints fails
to reveal increased resistance, since the extent of
reduced sensitivity is still not sufficient for the
isolates to be classified in either the I or R
category. This may occur either because the
phenotypic expression of resistance is too weak,
or because of the extreme natural sensitivity of the
species to the antibiotic in question (see the
examples listed in Table 25). In such cases it
might be helpful—or even necessary—to express
the results quantitatively (inhibition zone diam-
eter or MIC) in order to identify isolates with
decreased susceptibility within the S category.
The correlation of quantitative data with epi-
demiological cut-off values would also be of value
in the following cases:
• when the breakpoint divides wild-type distri-
butions of bacteria (something which should be
avoided by breakpoint committees), in which
case even small methodological shifts may
result in major shifts in resistance frequencies;
• wherever consensus on clinical or pharmacolo-
gical breakpoints is lacking, in which case only
epidemiological cut-off values allow compar-
ison of resistance development;
• whenever resistance (to new or old drugs) and
the consequent phenotypes have yet to be
described, in which case efforts are concentra-
ted primarily on recognising resistant isolates
as soon as they occur;
• when studying the relationship between anti-
biotic use and the emergence and development
of resistance.
Management of MIC results for producing
quantitative reports
Currently, quantitative data on the activity of
antimicrobials are reported as the range of MICs,
50% MIC (MIC50), and 90% MIC (MIC90). The
usefulness of this way of reporting stems from its
ability to condense many data into a single figure,
and therefore it may be useful for abstract
reporting. Nevertheless, its analytical and des-
criptive value remains highly controversial, par-
ticularly in Europe (see below). Two-fold
dilutions are used commonly but 1.5-fold dilu-
tions can also be found and are typical of data
obtained by means of the Etest. However, Etest
results can be pooled with those obtained by other
susceptibility testing methods after being roun-
ded to the nearest higher two-fold dilution value.
Endpoints are often not clear-cut, particularly
in automated systems, because of the limited
number of dilutions available. Thus, MIC results
are reported often as either ‘equal to or lower
than’ or ‘equal to or higher than’ given endpoints;
since these endpoints are fairly variable, different
reports are often not comparable completely,
although applying restriction rules for inclusion
of diverse values in the analysis could make it
possible to extract valid information, even from
heterogeneous quantitative reporting.
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The usual tables of quantitative data may list a
number of fields, such as species, antibiotic,
number of isolates, range, MIC90 and MIC50.
Considerations regarding the listing of species,
antibiotics and number of isolates are the same as
those outlined for semiquantitative data (see
above).
The MIC range (expressed as mg ⁄L or lg ⁄mL)
reports both the lowest and the highest suscepti-
bility value obtained for a given microorganism–
antimicrobial pair, but does not provide any
information about the MIC distribution within
these extreme figures. Moreover, even a single
atypical or even misidentified isolate can affect
the range strongly, which actually provides the
reader with only very limited and often mislead-
ing information.
The MIC90 (also expressed as mg ⁄L or lg ⁄mL)
has been used as the most common parameter for
reporting and comparing antibiotic susceptibility
data. By representing the MIC capable of inhib-
iting at least 90% of the isolates investigated, it is
reasonably representative of the susceptibility of a
species and provides a prudent estimate of the
expected susceptibility of isolates of the same
species when reports are used to assist clinicians
in selection of the most appropriate agents for
empirical antimicrobial therapy. However, as in
the case of the MIC range, the MIC90 does
not provide any information about the MIC
Table 25. Examples of situations
where many clinical or pharma-
cological breakpoints may fail to
disclose the development of micro-
biological resistance because of the
large gap in MIC concentrations
between the breakpoint and the
MIC for a very sensitive species
Antibiotic Examples of species Comment
Ampicillin Helicobacter pylori Most breakpoint systems use an
ampicillin breakpoint of 8 or 16 mg ⁄L
to accommodate the wild-type
distribution of E. coli. The
Helicobacter pylori wild-type
organism does not exceed
0.125 mg ⁄L
Cephalosporins E. coli and Shigella Decreased sensitivity to
first-generation cephalosporins
or to the amoxycillin–clavulanate
combination, or to mecillinam
because of penicillinase production.
E. coli with decreased sensitivity to
third-generation cephalosporins
through cephalosporinase
hyperproduction
Chloramphenicol Haemophilus influenzae One of the first examples
(now corrected by most
breakpoint committees) where a
breakpoint designed for
Enterobacteriaceae failed to detect
CAT-producing H. influenzae
Fluconazole Candida albicans The NCCLS breakpoints of
S £ 8 mg ⁄L and R ‡ 64 mg ⁄L
leave a large gap between the wild-type
(ending at 0.5 mg ⁄L) and the
breakpoint. Incidentally, this would
never be a problem with amphotericin B,
because the clinical breakpoint is
perfectly in line with the epidemiological
breakpoint
Fusidic acid Staphylococcus aureus Low-level fusidic acid
resistance in S. aureus (the clinical
relevance of which is still not established)
goes undetected by pharmacological
breakpoints
Imipenem,
meropenem
Most Gram-positive bacteria;
several Enterobacteriaceae
A classic example where a breakpoint
designed to accommodate both
Enterobacteriaceae and Pseudomonas
often fails to disclose the production of
PBP2a in MRSA
Penicillin Streptococcus pyogenes Not yet described, but it is highly
likely that if resistance mechanisms do
spread to or develop in Strep. pyogenes,
only the Strep. pneumoniae low-level
resistance breakpoint will be able to
disclose the resistance
Rifampicin Staphylococcus aureus Large gap between MIC of wild type
(ending at 0.064 mg ⁄L) and breakpoints
(most of which are at 1 mg ⁄L or higher)
Fluoroquinolones Enterobacteriaceae
Neisseria gonorrhoeae
Large or extremely large gap between
MIC of wild type and breakpoint.
Neisseria meningitidis
Haemophilus influenzae
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distribution above or below its own value, and its
value may change significantly when even only
small numbers of isolates endowed with MICs
different from the remainder are included in the
analysis. This, of course, is much more likely to
happen when a small number of isolates is
considered, since a far more conspicuous subset
of aberrant isolates needs to be present in order to
modify the value of the ninetieth percentile.
The MIC50 (also expressed as mg ⁄L or lg ⁄mL)
can be regarded as complementary to the MIC90,
and has also been used as a common parameter
for reporting and comparing antibiotic suscepti-
bility data. By representing the MIC capable of
inhibiting at least 50% of the isolates investigated,
it is not very representative of the susceptibility of
a species, and an estimate of the expected sus-
ceptibility of isolates within a given species would
not be prudent if based only on MIC50 values.
However, the calculated value is more stable than
the MIC90, and is less likely to undergo significant
changes following inclusion of small numbers of
unusual isolates. It may therefore be of some help
in comparing reports from different susceptibility
studies.
The combination of the MIC90 and MIC50,
rather than the MIC90 or MIC50 alone, provides
a better, albeit rather static, representation of
isolate susceptibility, but cannot reflect the MIC
distribution accurately throughout the dilution
range. This can be appreciated only in tables
reporting the population distribution of MICs
and, even better, by graphic presentations.
In the population distribution of MICs, data
may be arranged as a cumulative antimicrobial
susceptibility report, usually listing the microor-
ganisms on the y-axis and the percentages cor-
responding to each individual MIC value in the
range on the x-axis; the number of isolates tested
is also placed on the x-axis. In another type of
report, the percentages on the x-axis are increased
by the additional percentages corresponding to
increasing MIC values up to a final value of 100.
A population distribution of MICs, although
not very popular, is the most informative way of
listing antibiotic activity. This distribution is
extremely important, not only for critical evalua-
tion of susceptibility data, but also for determin-
ing epidemiological cut-off values. These do not
depend on pharmacological and clinical criteria,
and allow comparison of resistance rates on the
basis of the microbiological characteristics of the
resistance, which do not differ between countries,
while international agreement on clinical break-
points may remain an elusive goal [45].
The use of graphics in reporting quantitative data
Visual presentation of the susceptibility distribu-
tion in the report might possibly add value to all
or most of the reporting methods used currently
[48]. The population distribution of antibiotic
susceptibility patterns can be studied readily
from a scattergram—obtained from zone diame-
ters as related to MICs——or from a histogram
showing the distribution of susceptibility values.
The use of histograms as a means of conveying
susceptibility test results affords a convenient and
intelligent presentation of data that enables the
reader to understand readily the report received,
and to relate the susceptibilities of given strains to
those of other members of the species and to the
interpretative clinical categories.
Susceptibility distribution has various patterns.
Some distributions are unimodal, with a cluster of
MICs over a narrow range (e.g., glycopeptides vs.
pneumococci). A unimodal distribution generally
occurs when a new antibiotic is introduced. Since
acquired and naturally resistant strains are
encountered with increasing frequency as a result
of selection through the extended use of an
antibiotic, the unimodal clustering is altered, with
an increasingly pronounced tendency towards a
skewed or frankly bimodal distribution. Recogni-
tion of this event at an early stage is important,
and such trends should be followed closely in
clustering analysis.
Other susceptibility distributions are typically
bimodal, with a definite cluster of resistant
strains, a second cluster of susceptible strains,
and only a few strains in between (e.g., penicillin
vs. staphylococci). Other drugs produce bimodal
distributions, with more strains falling between
the sensitive and resistant clusters (e.g., penicillin
vs. pneumococci) because of a wider range of
expression of the resistance mechanism(s); the
narrowness of the intermediate range undermines
the use of a breakpoint as a means of distinguish-
ing between resistance and susceptibility.
One virtually unexplored field is that of repre-
senting, either graphically or as a table, the resist-
ance variations over time (a sort of ‘derivative’, to
use mathematical terminology). The scarcity of
databases spanning a sufficiently lengthy period of
time that are endowed with good internal consis-
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tency is probably responsible for the shortage of
this kind of information, which would be useful
for a more accurate analysis of resistance trends
over time, and for appreciating the importance of
those resistance surges which, though not attain-
ing very high values in absolute terms, entail a
sharp, rapid increase with respect to baseline
values. Moreover, figures alone seldom seem to
be capable of providing a clear-cut picture, while
variation over time provides a picture that is not
dependent upon the ‘absolute’ value of figures,
and thus adds a further dimension to the data to
ensure prompt recognition of phenomena, as well
as a better appreciation of their importance.
M A N A G E M E N T A N D O U T C O M E O F
A N T I M I C R O B I A L R E S I S T A N C E
S U R V E I L L A N C E
Paper surveillance studies
A vast amount of information about antibiotic
susceptibility and resistance is presented regu-
larly in different scientific meetings or published
in journals, books or brochures around Europe.
The availability, and therefore the impact, of this
information on public health is probably still only
minimal. Current information retrieval systems
allow the recovery of these data for surveillance
purposes. These paper surveillance studies, in the
form of continuous updating of published or
presented data about particular bacteria–antibi-
otic pairs, should be carried out by experts. They
should be capable of assessing the quality control
selection measures, including the methods used
in the research, the reputation of the journal or
meeting, and the investigators and the guarantees
that they offer. Such studies can take advantage of
the methods afforded by previous experiences in
meta-analytical research. Indeed, part of the
interest of paper surveillance studies lies in their
ability to establish retrospective baselines of
resistance rates, which prove useful in the inter-
pretation of recent trends. This continuous data
retrieval strategy was first proposed by ESGARS
in 2001, and was subsequently adopted by the
EU-funded ARPAC Programme in 2003.
Surveillance and the pharmaceutical industry: from
drug development to clinical trials
Surveillance studies aimed at the early detection
of resistance to new drugs should start in phases
II and III of the development of new or modified
antibacterial agents, and should expand into
phase IV. These studies should be based on the
use of selective broth or plates containing differ-
ent concentrations of the new drug, to be inocu-
lated with specimens of the normal microbiota of
patients, in order to evaluate the possibility of
emergence of resistance. New resistant strains
should be investigated properly to identify the
mechanisms of resistance, the biological cost for
the resistant strain, and the possibility of hori-
zontal gene transfer. Investigations of new resist-
ant strains should also include clinical aspects
(particularly if resistance is associated with thera-
peutic failure) and epidemiological aspects (with
special reference to their clonality).
Surveillance and the pharmaceutical industry: from
surveillance studies to industrial environmental
policies
During the last decade, a number of well-funded
surveillance studies have been conducted at the
initiative of the pharmaceutical industry, and
frequently under the technical guidance of scien-
tific experts. Some of these studies are of high
quality. Unfortunately, many of them have been
operative for only a few years, since an important
part of their funding originated in the marketing
departments. The immediate benefits for the com-
panies are to compare the performance (frequently
advantageous) of their products with those of their
competitors, to publicise and expand the visibility
of their antibiotics in meetings and publications,
and to ensure a cooperative relationship with
opinion leaders in the field of antibiotic therapy.
These goals are frequently dependent on the
availability of competitive products in the field.
The new concepts of environmental control and
ecological remediation by the industry may help to
sustain these activities in future.
Information industry: surveillance companies
A number of private companies specialising in
medical information, and owning powerful infor-
matics and bioinformatics platforms, are able to
construct local as well as global resistance databas-
es on antibiotic resistance. In some cases the
companies also have reference laboratory facilities
(corporate or contracted) and can therefore set
up a comprehensive collection of strains. While
the main customers of these companies are
often pharmaceutical companies, nothing should
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prevent the appropriate use of the raw data, and
eventually the strains themselves, for public health
purposes if required by official institutions or
academia to fulfil well-defined objectives. More-
over, frequent publication of relevant data by the
information company itself is most welcome.
Surveillance hyper-networks
The problem of antibiotic resistance is a global
risk for public health, and surveillance systems
should have no frontiers. Many international,
national and regional organisations, as well as
scientific societies around the world, are currently
developing different surveillance systems simul-
taneously. As stated earlier, industry (i.e., the
pharmaceutical or information industry) also
operates a large number of surveillance systems
in parallel. Surveillance studies are flowing over
from human medicine into the fields of veterinary
medicine, the food industry, agriculture and
environmental biology. This complex situation
has led to a number of initiatives aimed at
creating hyper-networks or ‘networks of net-
works’. Surveillance hyper-networks are certainly
needed to understand global trends and to
increase the sensitivity of the alert function, but
obviously the hub or powerhouse of most net-
works should coincide with the point at which
measures can be taken to control undesirable
deviations that might be detected.
Publishing of surveillance studies
Surveillance is a scientifically-based activity, and
not a process of blind collection and dissemination
of data. Any surveillance system should be aware
of the intrinsic possibility of including erroneous
data, and should make every effort to minimise this
risk. In other words, data inputs to the surveillance
system should be edited carefully before public
release. When dealing with possible emerging
resistances, it is sometimes difficult for surveil-
lance systems to discard abnormal or unexpected
results automatically, based on the application of
so-called ‘expert systems’. In case of uncertainty,
the abnormal result should be released as pre-
sumptive information, and all relevant doubts
should be stated clearly. At the same time, every
effort should be made to ensure that the laboratory
where the abnormality was detected takes all
appropriate steps to confirm the suspicion, if
necessary with the help of reference laboratories.
Prediction and surveillance of resistance
Surveillance needs to use landmarks or ‘flags’ for
the early detection of antibiotic resistance. Await-
ing the clinical emergence of a resistant microor-
ganism before ascertaining its phenotype and
determining the surveillance flag position (cut-off
value or breakpoint) in a gradient of MICs may be
a risky policy. The clinical emergence of a given
bacterial variant may come too late to allow the
application of counteractive control measures.
This is particularly critical for new drugs in the
late stages of development or recently launched
on the therapeutic market. A number of proce-
dures, many of them based on molecular genetics,
and frequently using genomics and proteomics
technology, may enable the likelihood of emer-
gence of resistant variants of important bacterial
pathogens to be predicted.
Carefully controlled experiments can predict the
behaviour of a particular pathogen if a particular
resistance gene is introduced into the organism. For
instance, the introduction of ESBL genes into
H. influenzae has suggested that NCCLS testing
methods may have difficulty in detecting such
strains. Stepwise selection procedures have pre-
dicted the phenotype of vancomycin-intermediate
S. aureus, or linezolid-resistant Ent. faecium. The use
of hyper-mutable bacterial strains has also been
proposed as a predictive strategy for the early
detection of resistance mechanisms. All these
techniques should provide insights into the expec-
ted phenotypic features of a possible resistant
strain, to be considered when interpreting partic-
ular MICs or establishing surveillance cut-off
values.
Intervention-orientated surveillance
The main goal of surveillance is intervention.
Brilliant academic analysis of evolutionary trends
of antimicrobial resistance constitutes a by-prod-
uct of surveillance, but if intervention is not
implemented as a result of surveillance pro-
grammes, the final outcome will be failure. On
the other hand, intervention cannot be designed,
planned or controlled without appropriate sur-
veillance programmes. Any type of surveillance
study should conclude, where appropriate, with a
proposal for intervention based on the data
obtained. Educational programmes in the field
of antibiotic therapy and epidemiological inter-
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ventions should take advantage of surveillance
studies. Dissemination of information in the form
of periodic resistance and intervention data bul-
letins is advisable.
Surveillance should always suggest, or even
generate automatically, some type of reaction
and ⁄ or intervention. For instance, surveillance
data can lead to the removal of a given drug from
an accepted official list of indications. There is an
important controversy regarding the resistance
rate that an antibiotic has to attain in a particular
setting for declassification of its use for a partic-
ular clinical indication. In other words, the dis-
cussion has to do with the critical resistance level
beyond which isolates of a particular species can
be regarded generally as resistant to a given drug
in a given place and over a given period of time.
This aspect is of major importance for empirical
therapy. Several reports on the treatment of UTI
with particular drugs (e.g., co-trimoxazole, quino-
lones) have suggested that when resistance occurs
in >10–20% of isolates, the corresponding anti-
microbial agents should not be used for empirical
treatment [49]. The establishment of these critical
percentages for particular bacterium–antibiotic
combinations depends mainly on the severity of
the infections and on the availability of alternative
therapies. What is clear is that use of an antibiotic
regardless of the aforementioned ‘critical’ resist-
ance rate will lead to a further selection of
resistant bacterial populations, and probably of
genetic vectors associated with resistance genes. If
surveillance detects resistance in a dangerous
organism, with no or few alternative drugs
capable of controlling it, even a very low resist-
ance rate should be considered high risk, and
appropriate action should be planned.
Defining and updating activity spectra for
inclusion in summaries of product
characteristics (SPCs)
This is a process that should be based on
surveillance programmes. To group species in
the three therapeutic classes of antibiotic activity
(see below) for inclusion in SPCs, according to the
European norms for antibacterial medicinal prod-
ucts [50], European and national agencies for
health product safety need both information on
strain populations and general statistics on
acquired resistance for the main bacterial species
of medical importance. Indeed, for each antibiotic:
• the ‘susceptible’ category includes bacterial
species that are susceptible naturally to the
antibiotic in question [51] with prevalence
ranges (expressed in percentage) of acquired
resistance;
• the ‘moderately susceptible category’ includes
bacterial species that present intermediate sus-
ceptibility naturally to the antibiotic in question
(e.g., enterococci for penicillin G);
• the ‘resistant’ category includes the naturally
resistant species (e.g., Enterobacteriaceae and
mycobacteria for penicillin G) and naturally
susceptible species in which the prevalence of
acquired resistance is high (e.g., S. aureus and
Moraxella catarrhalis for penicillin G).
Defining therapeutic indications of antibiotics
Provided that they are presented along with the
few pieces of information that come usually
with clinical samples submitted to medical
microbiology laboratories (e.g., sampling site,
inpatient or outpatient status), general statistics
on acquired resistance can contribute to defining
the antibiotic indications that figure in SPCs.
However, statistics on resistance in documented
infections within well-defined epidemiological
contexts are of primary importance in this
connection.
Establishing recommendations on antibiotic
therapy and good antibiotic usage
In order to help prescribers, medical scientific
societies and health authorities to establish na-
tional recommendations on antibiotic therapy and
appropriate antibiotic usage, the prevalence of
resistance must be established for given clinical
situations (documented infections) in well-de-
fined epidemiological contexts. This is the case
with common infections (e.g., UTIs, lower respir-
atory tract infections, acute otitis media) and
particularly severe infections (e.g., community-
acquired pneumonia or meningitis in patients
admitted to hospital emergency units). In this
connection, resistance can be provided not only
for each bacterial species separately (e.g., co-
trimoxazole sensitivity rates in E. coli strains
responsible for cystitis in women with no recent
history of infection, antibiotic therapy or hospi-
talisation), but also for the species possibly
involved taken as a whole (e.g., rates of sensitivity
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of bacteria responsible for community-acquired or
hospital-acquired bacteraemia to third-generation
cephalosporins, aminoglycosides and fluoroqui-
nolones).
For this purpose, it is also of importance to take
into account parameters that are known to be
linked significantly to the prevalence of resist-
ance, and that constitute risk factors for resistance
in the type of infection considered (e.g., age,
history of antibiotic therapy, previous hospitali-
sation) which can be evaluated easily by the
prescriber.
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